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CAN HOME RULE IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA SURVIVE THE CHADHA
DECISION?
Bruce Comly French*

More than a decade has passed since the enactment of the District of
Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act
(Home Rule Act).' In this Act, the Congress delegated much of its constitutional authority affecting the District of Columbia2 to an elected
* Associate Professor of Law, Claude W. Pettit College of Law, Ohio Northern University. Lecturer, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America. B.A., The
American University, 1969; M.A., The American University, 1970; J.D., Antioch College
School of Law, 1975. The author was Legislative Counsel to the Council of the District of
Columbia (1979-1983) and Staff Director and Counsel to the Committee on Government
Operations, Council of the District of Columbia (1975-1978). The author recognizes and
appreciates the assistance of M. Ann Thomas and Sharon Saady, third-year students at the
Claude W. Pettit College of Law, Ohio Northern University, in the preparation of this
article.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973) (codified in scattered sections of the D.C.
CODE) [hereinafter cited as Home Rule Act].
2. U.S. CONST., art I, § 8, cl. 17, provides, inter alia:
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not
exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States
D.C.

§ 1-227 (1981 & Supp. 1984) provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Subject to the limitations specified in §§ 1-206, 1-207, 1-233, and 47-313, the
legislative power granted to the District by this Act is vested in and shall be exercised by the Council in accordance with this Act. In addition, except as otherwise
provided in this Act, all functions granted to or imposed upon, or vested in or
transferred to the District of Columbia Council, as established by Reorganization
Plan No. 3 of 1967, shall be carried out by the Council in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.
CODE ANN.

(e) An act passed by the Council shall be presented by the Chairman of the
Council to the Mayor, who shall, within 10 calendar days (excluding Saturdays,
Sundays, and holidays) after the act is presented to him, either approve or disapprove such act. If the Mayor shall approve such act, he shall indicate the same by
affixing his signature thereto, and such act shall become law subject to the provisions of § 1-233(c). If the Mayor shall disapprove such act, he shall, within 10
calendar days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays) after it is presented to
him, return such act to the Council setting forth in writing his reasons for such
disapproval. If any act so passed shall not be returned to the Council by the Mayor
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Mayor 3 and Council.4 Under the Home Rule Act, Congress exercises its
retained constitutional authority5 by adopting simple6 or concurrent 7 resowithin 10 calendar days after it shall have been presented to him, the Mayor shall
be deemed to have approved it, and such act shall become law subject to the provisions of § 1-233(c) unless the Council by a recess of 10 days or more prevents its
return, in which case it shall not become law. If, within 30 calendar days after an
act has been timely returned by the Mayor to the Council with his disapproval,
two-thirds of the members of the Council present and voting vote to reenact such
act, the act so reenacted shall become law subject to the provisions of § 1-233(c).
See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-204 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
3. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-241 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
4. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-221 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
5. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-206 (1981 & Supp. 1984) provides, inter alia:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the Congress of the United
States reserves the right, at any time, to exercise its constitutional authority as legislature for the District, by enacting legislation for the District on any subject,
whether within or without the scope of legislative power granted to the Council by
this Act, including legislation to amend or repeal any law in force in the District
prior to or after enactment of this Act and any act passed by the Council.
6. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(c)(2) (1981 & Supp. 1984), provides, inter alia:
(c)(2) In the case of any such act transmitted by the Chairman with respect to
any act codified in Title 22, 23, or 24, such act shall take effect at the end of the 30day period beginning on the day such act is transmitted by the Chairman to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate only if
during such 30-day period 1 House of Congress does not adopt a resolution disapproving such act. The provisions of § 1-207, relating to an expedited procedure for
consideration of resolutions, shall apply to a simple resolution disapproving such
act as specified in this paragraph.
See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-102 (1981 & Supp. 1984) concerning the use of simple or
concurrent resolutions to direct the President's control of the Metropolitan Police
Department.
7. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-207 (1981 & Supp. 1984) and D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(c)(1)
(Supp. 1984). D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(c)(1) (Supp. 1984) provides, inter alia:
(c)(1) Except acts of the Council which are submitted to the President in accordance with Chapter 11 of Title 31, United States Code, any act which the Council
determines, according to § 1-229(a), should take effect immediately because of
emergency circumstances, and acts proposing amendments to title IV of this Act
and except as provided in § 47-322(c) and § 47-328(d)(1) the Chairman of the
Council shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the
President of the Senate, a copy of each act passed by the Council and signed by the
Mayor, or vetoed by the Mayor and repassed by two-thirds of the Council present
and voting, each act passed by the Council and allowed to become effective by the
Mayor without his signature, and each initiated act and act subject to referendum
which has been ratified by a majority of the registered qualified electors voting on
the initiative or referendum. Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, no such act shall take effect until the end of the 30-day period (excluding
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, and any day on which neither House is in session because of an adjournment sine die, a recess of more than 3 days, or an adjournment of more than 3 days) beginning on the day such act is transmitted by the
Chairman to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate and then only if during such 30-day period-both Houses of Congress do not
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lutions of disapproval' to reject Council "acts" 9 it disfavors. At the same
time, Congress continues to enact public laws that affect the District of
Columbia, usually in subject matter areas in which the Council lacks legislative authority. °
With several salient exceptions, the District of Columbia courts have
broadly construed the provisions of the Home Rule Act to uphold the
Council's exercise of authority." Litigation has focused upon compliance
with the procedural terms of the Home Rule Act and an interpretation of
the Act's proscriptions upon local authority.' 2 These decisions have never
questioned the fundamental design of the Home Rule Act.
On June 23, 1983, the Supreme Court decided Immigration andNaturalization Service v. Chadha,'3 holding unconstitutional Congress' use of legislative veto resolutions in the exercise of its lawmaking functions.' 4
Because the District of Columbia Home Rule Act contains a legislative
veto provision, Chadha requires that the courts review the constitutional
relationship between the District of Columbia and the Federal
Establishment.
This article will first address the nature of the legislative authority Congress delegated to the District of Columbia government.' 5 The Supreme
Court' 6 has upheld delegation of this legislative authority with certain exadopt a concurrent resolution disapproving such act. The provisions of § 1-207,
except subsections (d), (e), and (f) of such section, shall apply with respect to any
concurrent resolution disapproving any act pursuant to this paragraph.
In its original formulation, the President exercised a role if the Mayor vetoed the bill and
it was overridden by the Council. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-147(c)(1) (1973 & Supp. V 1978).
8. See supra notes 6-7. In addition, a concurrent resolution of "approval" is used to
effect congressional concurrence with the voters' adoption of an amendment to title IV of the
Home Rule Act. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-205(b) (1981).
9. In the exercise of its legislative authority the Council enacts acts. The Council's
rules concerning the legislative process are reprinted at D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-227 (1981)
(notes §§ 401-429 (Supp. 1984)); see also French, Council of the District of Columbia Legislative DraftingManual-RevisedEdition, 25 HOWARD L.J. 731, 773 (1982) [hereinafter cited as

French Drafting Manual].
10. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-701 to 1-748, 5-1201 to 5-1212, 11-903, 11-1561 to
11-1571, 11-1732 (1981 & Supp. 1984). As an example of pending measures, see H.R. 3920,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (amending the Home Rule Act to authorize the Council to enact
measures relating to the landlord-tenant branch of the superior court) and S. 1912, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (amending D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-502(a) (1981) to change the membership requirements for the District of Columbia Commission on Mental Health).
1t. See infra notes 30-153 and accompanying text.
12. Id
13. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
14. Id. at 2788.
15. See supra note 2 and infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 19-49 and accompanying text.
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ceptions, but these decisions precede Chadha.7 The article will then present an overview of the Chadha case and set the framework for the new
constitutional analysis of the Home Rule Act. The application of the
Chadha holding to the unique circumstances of the District of Columbia
also will be considered, including a discussion of the constitutional defects
in the Home Rule Act discovered since Chadha.'8 The article will conclude with recommendations for legislative solutions to correct the infirmities of the Home Rule Act.
I.

THE EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY BY THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

A.

The HistoricalSetting

The District of Columbia has constituted the national seat of government since the administration of John Adams. Under the United States
Constitution the legislative control of the District is vested in the Congress. 9 Throughout the District's history Congress has experimented with
vesting various forms of legislative power in the Mayor and District of
Columbia Council (Council).2" Although this delegation of authority has
removed the Congress from much of the day-to-day management of the
city, the Congress has always retained the authority to override local
initiatives. 2 '
The early legislative bodies exercised delegated authority consistent with
the organic acts of Congress.2 2 These limited experiments with home rule
17. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 218-94 and accompanying text.
19. See supra notes 2, 5.
20. The Act of July 16, 1790, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 139, accepted the transfer of jurisdiction
from Maryland and Virginia to establish the District of Columbia. The Act of May 3, 1802,
ch. 53, 2 Stat. 195, established a mayor-council form of government as the first home rule in
the District of Columbia. The 12 members of the District of Columbia Council were locally
elected and served in a two-chamber legislature. The legislative authority was severely restricted. Act of May 3, 1802, ch. 53, § 7, 2 Stat. 197. The delegation cases, surveyed infra
text accompanying notes 21-153, were all decided prior to Chadha. The chronicling of local
legislative experience may be found in Newman & DePuy, Bringing Democracy to the Nation's Last Colony.- The District of Columbia Self-Goyernment Act, 24 AM. U.L. REV. 537,
544-45 (1975); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 1-102 (West 1978).

The Legislative Assembly established by the Act of February 21, 1871, ch. 62, § 5, 16 Stat.
419 had many of the same ingredients as the current Home Rule Council. Local ordinances
were adopted that were subject to modification or repeal by the Congress.
21. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-206 (1981 & Supp. 1984) and D.C. CODE ANN. § I233(c) (Supp. 1984).
22. Even before the advent of Home Rule to the District of Columbia, discussed infra
notes 50-153, the following have been upheld as permissible exercises of the congressional
power to delegate its lawmaking authority to "rightful subjects of legislation" to the Govern-
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came to an end with the abolition of the elected Legislative Assembly in
1874.23 At this time legislative and executive functions were merged into a
commission form 24 of government which endured until the mid-1960's.21
Nevertheless, Congress still retained true legislative authority for the District of Columbia during this period. The District of Columbia board of
commissioners implemented the laws for the District of Columbia that
Congress enacted.26 Local regulatory measures were usually designated
Acts of the Legislative Assembly 27 or Commissioners' Orders.28 But in
each of these instances the locally-adopted measures were regulatory and
ment of the District of Columbia: District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S.
100, 109 (1953) (Supreme Court sustained a delegation to adopt ordinances and regulations
"subject of course to constitutional limitations to which all lawmaking is subservient.");

Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141 (1889) (D.C. constituted a body corporate with all
the powers of a municipal corporation, not inconsistent with laws of the United States; act
conferred upon D.C. only municipal powers and did not authorize it to impose license upon
persons soliciting sales of goods on behalf of persons doing business outside D.C. which
would be a regulation of commerce in violation of Constitution. The fact that Congress
repealed and modified various parts of the acts of the Legislative Assembly containing the
clause imposing such license, cannot be held to amount to a ratification of that clause by
Congress, the parts repealed and modified being separately operative, and such as were
within scope of municipal action); Metropolitan R.R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. I
(1889) (D.C. is a municipal corporation, having a right to sue and be sued, and subject to the
ordinary rules that govern the law of procedure between private persons.); Fireman's Ins.
Co. v. Washington, 483 F.2d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Insurance regulations of the District of
Columbia were within police power of the City Council. While it possesses no inherent
legislative authority, the City Council does have broad delegation of police power from
Congress.); Maryland and District of Columbia Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Washington, 442
F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (When the legislative branch of the District is working within the
scope of its permitted powers, and Congress has likewise legislated on the subject matter, the
two may coexist in identical areas although the District may have exacted additional requirements or imposed additional penalties so long as the two are not inconsistent.); United
States ex rel The Brightwood Ry. v. O'Neal, 10 App. D.C. 205 (1897) (Congress' establishment of the court of the justice of the peace was within the usual scope of the general power
of legislation over the District of Columbia.); see also on question of delegation and, the
breadth thereof, Newman & DePuy, supra note 20, at 569-73, 631-43.
23. First temporarily, and then permanently, locally elected municipal home rule ended
in 1874. Act of June 20, 1874, ch. 337, 18 Stat. 116, and Act of June 11, 1878, ch. 180, 20
Stat. 103. Three presidentially-appointed commissioners governed the District of Columbia
for the next 93 years.
24. See, e.g., 2 E. MCQUILLEN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 9.20 (3d ed. 1979).
25. The Home Rule Act became effective as to the governance of the District of Columbia on Jan. 2, 1975.
26. Federal agencies issue rules to implement their authority under 5 U.S.C. §§ 501 to
576 (1982). For specific examples of similar District of Columbia pronouncements, see infra
notes 27, 28, 40.
27. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-261, 1-263 (1981 & Supp. 1984). See Newman & DePuy,
supra note 20, at 724-44; French Drafting Manual, supra note 9, at 773.
28. See French Drafting Manual, supra note 9, at 774.
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carried out the enactments of Congress. 29
The seminal Supreme Court case that considered the delegation of authority from Congress to the District of Columbia government is District of
Columbia v. John R Thompson Co. 30 The Thompson company violated a
District of Columbia ordinance that prohibited the operators of a restaurant to refuse to serve persons solely on account of their race or color. 3 '
Thompson presented the Supreme Court with two questions: whether the
Legislative Assembly had authority to enact the open public accommodations ordinance, and if so, whether that ordinance was still in effect after
the demise of the Legislative Assembly in 1874. Several of the acts of the
Legislative Assembly had been reenacted by Congress or codified in the
1901 Code of Laws for the District of Columbia which gave rise to an
argument that the public accommodations ordinance was impliedly repealed because it was not included in the compilation or reenacted. 32 The
Court held that Congress has authority to "delegat[e] . . . full legislative
power [to the District of Columbia], subject of course to constitutional limitations to which all law making is subservient and subject also to the
power of Congress at any time to revise, alter, or revoke the authority
granted."3 3 Two thorny problems of "municipal" vis-a-vis "general" authority that had been the subject of an earlier case 34 and the nature of
Congress' "exclusive" legislative authority under the Constitution3 5 were
resolved by the Court. The Court concluded that Congress could not delegate its "national" power to the District of Columbia legislature and that
Congress' "exclusive" authority was exclusive because the neighboring
states from which the District had been ceded did not have any of this
legislative power.36 In addition, the Supreme Court held that the Acts of
the Legislative Assembly had not been impliedly repealed by the latter
codification of District laws by the Congress, and therefore, remained
effective.37
29. Newman & DePuy, supra note 20, at 727 & n. 17. Note that the Legislative Assembly, by Act 180, June 25, 1873, amended the Act of Feb. 12, 1873, ch. 133, 17 Stat. 436. The
analysis appears flawed in that an additional set of funds were provided for related projects.
In any event this isolated, implied amendment lends no support to override basic Chadha
problems presented infra in text accompanying notes 218-84.
30. 346 U.S. 100 (1953).
31. Id.at 103 n.l.
32. Id at 110-13.
33. Id. at 109.
34. Id at 107 (citing Metropolitan R.R. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1 (1889) and
Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141 (1889)).
35. Thompson, 346 U.S. at 109.
36. Id.
37. Id.at 110.

Home Rule
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In 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson transmitted to the Congress the
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1967.38 Under the Reorganization Plan, an
appointed District of Columbia Council and Commissioner (Mayor) of the
District of Columbia were established.3 9 Although no new powers were
conferred, the structure of the local government once again differentiated
between executive and legislative functions.
The appointed city council exercised its delegated legislative authority
through the use of regulations.4 ° Regulations were adopted by the city
council, subject to the approval or veto of the commissioner. 4' If approved, or adopted following executive rejection, the regulations became
immediately effective, or effective at a later time as the city council directed.4 2 In all instances where the city council operated, a specific basis of
authority within section 402 of the Reorganization Plan had to be found.43
Congress did not retain a direct legislative veto over these measures, or
allow the city council to directly amend congressional acts affecting the
District of Columbia.
The city council's grant of authority provided control over myriad municipal functions, 44 and Congress continued to enact and amend its acts
that affected the District of Columbia.4 5 Municipal police regulations
38. 32 Fed. Reg. 11,669 (1967), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. 1109 (1982).
39. 32 Fed. Reg. 11,669 (1967), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 201, 301, at 1109-10 (1982).

40. See French Drafting Manual, supra note 9, at 774-75. For illustrative examples see:
Regulation to Prohibit the Employment of Professional Strikebreakers in the District of Columbia, 16 D.C. Reg. 294, Reg. 70-1; Regulation to Modify Existing Policies for the Provision of Day Care Services, 17 D.C. Reg. 479; Reg. 71-1; Retail Consumer Credit Regulation,

17 D.C. Reg. 815, Reg. 71-18; Regulations Governing the Provision of Contraceptive Information and Devices to Minors, 18 D.C. Reg. 154, Reg. 71-27; Regulation Governing Human

Rights, 20 D.C. Reg. 347 Reg. 73-22.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1967, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. § 406, at 1121 (1982).
Id
Id.§ 402.
The Reorganization Plan transferred unspecified and residual functions to the Com-

missioner (§ 401), while the Council received specific grants of authority over myriad subjects, all linked to specific statutory provisions in the D.C. Code: general provisions;
regulation of professions, occupations, etc.; public welfare; police and fire; building restrictions and regulations; health and safety; highways, streets, and bridges; parks; public buildings and grounds; weights, measures, and markets; feeble-minded persons; discrete and
limited criminal offenses; execution fees; discrete and limited matters affecting prisoners and
institutions; alcoholic beverages; charters of incorporation and money lending; tissue banks

and crematorium; standard time; corporations; limited matters affecting public education;
institutions, agencies and services; food and drugs; insurance; labor; motor vehicles; public
utilities; passenger motor vehicles for hire; real property; social security; taxation and fiscal
affairs; and miscellaneous provisions. Other "certain agencies" are specifically granted retained powers in § 501.
45. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 4-406 to 4-420, 11-101 to 11-2105, 35-1801 to 35-1811, 35-1901
to 35-1917, 47-3402 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
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were published in the District of Columbia Register 6 and occasionally
codified in the District of Columbia Rules and Regulations. 7 Acts of
Congress continued to be published in the Statutes at Large 48 and usually
49
codified in the District of Columbia Code.
B. Home Rule
The District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act was approved by President Richard M. Nixon on December 24, 1973.50 The elected Council of the District of Columbia that
assumed authority on January 2, 1975, was empowered to exercise the delegated "legislative power granted to the District by the [Home Rule
Act]."5
In stark contrast to the limited enumerated authorities of the appointed
city council,52 the power of the Home Rule Council is broad and plenary. 3 In addition to the grant of general powers, the Council exercises
specifically-delegated authority in a number of areas. These include authority to reorganize and establish offices and departments,5 4 develop local
personnel legislation, 5 approve a comprehensive plan for the National
Capital,56 adopt an annual budget act,5 7 issue revenue and general obligation bonds,5 8 and adopt acts to establish the advisory neighborhood com46. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1533 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
47. District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 90-614, § 8, 82
Stat. 1207 (1968). See generaly Mize, GuidelinesforDecipheringthe Laws ofa Unique CityState Legislature-The Council of the District of Columbia, 2 POTOMAC L. REV. 27 nn. 156,
161 (1978).
48. 1 U.S.C. § 112 (1982).
49. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 14, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-386, 90 Stat. 1170 and Act of July 30,
1947, ch. 388, § 202, 61 Stat. 637. See History of the District of Columbia Code, I D.C.
CODE ANN. at 1-16 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
50. See supra note 1.
51. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-227 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
52. See supra note 46.
53. See supra notes 2, 22.
54. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-227(b) (1981 & Supp. 1984), implemented by D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 1-299.1 to 1-299.6 (Supp. 1984).
55. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-242(3) (1981 & Supp. 1984), implemented by D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 1-601.1 to 1-637.2 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
56. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-244 (1981 & Supp. 1984), implemented by the District of Columbia Comprehensive Plan Act of 1984, 31 D.C. Reg. 1049-1180 (1984).
57. D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-304 (Supp. 1984), implemented annually See, e.g., Council
action: Fiscal Year 1980 Budget Request Act, Act 2-311, 25 D.C. Reg. 6094 (1978), and
Congressional action acting upon the recommendation of the Council: District of Columbia
Appropriation Act, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-93, 93 Stat. 713 (1980).
58. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 47-322, 47-334 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
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missions.5 9 Specific obligations were imposed on the Council in separate
acts of Congress concerning campaign finance and election matters 60 and
the city's retirement system.61
Of the specific obligations imposed upon the Council, only one requiring the development of a local personnel system has been subject to judicial challenge. In American Federation of Government Employees v.
Barry,61 labor unions representing District of Columbia government employees appealed from a judgment of the superior court that invalidated an
order of the Public Employee Relations Board directing Mayor Marion S.
Barry to bargain collectively with the unions concerning compensation.
The labor board had determined that the mayor's failure to bargain violated provisions of the District of Columbia Government Comprehensive
Merit Personnel Act of 197863 which mandated collective bargaining.6 a
Immediately prior to the labor board's bargaining order, the Council had
enacted emergency legislation that permitted a fixed pay raise by law for
city employees without regard to collective bargaining rights, and tempo59. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-251 (Supp. 1984), implemented by D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-252 to
1-270 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
60. The Council was directed to study the conduct of the 1974 primary elections in the
District of Columbia with an eye towards their improvement. Act of August 14, 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-376, § 704(a), 88 Stat. 458. The Council issued the Report of the Committee on
Government Operations of the Council of the District of Columbia Regarding the Management of the Election Held in 1974 (Sep. 1975), and subsequently enacted amendatory legislation, District of Columbia Election Act Amendments of 1976, Sep. 2, 1976, 23 D.C. Reg.
2050, D.C. Law 1-79. Section 401(b)(6) of the same Act required the Council to determine if
labor unions as such might continue to make contributions to political campaigns in the
District of Columbia. The Council answered in the affirmative. Corporations and Labor
Unions Campaign Finance Act of 1975, Sep. 23, 1975, 22 D.C. Reg. 1987, D.C. Law 1-16.
61. The Council was directed to adopt regulations concerning potential conflicts of interest under the city's retirement act. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-731 (1981 & Supp. 1984). The
Council's implementing regulations were adopted by the District of Columbia Retirement
Board First Regulations Adoption Act of 1983, 30 D.C. Reg. 2300 (1983).
62. 459 A.2d 1045 (D.C. 1983); see also D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-601.1 to 1-637.2 (1981),
as amended by D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-601.1 to 1-637.2 (Supp. 1984). With specific regard to
collective bargaining, labor relations, and compensation matters, see id §§ 1-605.1 to 1605.4, 1-612.1 to 1-612.15, 1-618.1 to 1-618.17 (1981 & Supp. 1984). For an analysis of the
Council's intentions in enacting this measure, see Council of the District of Columbia, Report of the Committee on Government Operations, Bill No. 2-10, District of Columbia Government Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act of 1978, July 5, 1978, reprinted in House of
Representives, Committee on the District of Columbia, District of Columbia Government
Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act of 1978, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979); French, Public
Sector Labor Relations in the District of Columbia, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 753 (1979).
63. American Federation,459 A.2d at 1047.
64. Id See District of Columbia Government Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act Pay
Provisions Emergency Declaration Resolution of 1980, Sep. 16, 1980, 27 D.C. Reg. 4284,
Res. 3-544, and District of Columbia Government Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act Pay
Provisions Emergency Amendments of 1980, Sep. 26, 1980, 27 D.C. Reg. 4273, Act 3-249.
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rarily amended the provisions of the personnel act requiring collective bargaining. In the trial court, the unions argued that in the absence of
bargaining, they were entitled to a pay raise comparable to federal employees, rather than the lower District of Columbia-approved sum. 65
In the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the unions contended that
the federal pay raise was required for two reasons: the Council had improperly invoked its emergency authority 66 and the Home Rule Act's specific statutory authority to develop a local personnel law 67 had been
misinterpreted. The emergency authority was challenged as not responsive
to an "unforseen circumstance" 68 in that compensation matters were annually adjusted on September 30th for the new fiscal year. The personnel
system developmental authority was challenged as violating the provision
of the Home Rule Act guaranteeing benefits "at least equal to" those enjoyed under the federal system before Home Rule.69
The appellate court determined that the emergency authority was justified and had been carefully documented in the accompanying resolution
declaring the emergency circumstances.7" The court also concluded that
the Council's prior adoption of the personnel act7 ' had removed the specific linkage to the federal system7 2 and that the flexibility with which the
Council addressed compensation matters was consistent with the "mandate of the Self-Government Act which was to turn over the administration of such local functions [as pay raises] to the District government.
Under title VI of the Home Rule Act, the Council's authority is limited
by specific subject matter proscriptions. These include restrictions upon
taxing the property of the United States or of any state,74 lending public
credit for the support of private undertakings,75 enacting or repealing any
act "which concerns the functions or property of the United States 7or6
which is not restricted in its application exclusively in or to the District,"
65. American Federation,459 A.2d at 1047-48.

66. Id at 1050.
67. Id at 1051.

68. Id at 1050 n.9.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.at 1051.
Id at 1050-5 1. See supra note 64.
American Federation, 459 A.2d at 1051-53.
Id at 1051.

73. Id
74. D.C. CODE

ANN.

§ 1-233(a) (1981 & Supp. 1984) provides, inter alia: "(a) The

Council shall have no authority to pass any act contrary to the provisions of this Act except
as specifically provided in this Act, or to: (1) Impose any tax on property of the United
States or any of the several states .... "
75. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(a)(2) (1981 & Supp. 1984).

76. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(a)(3) (1981 & Supp. 1984).
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enacting any measure with regard to the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia courts," imposing tax upon the income of any individual not a
resident of the District of Columbia,78 enacting any measures affecting the
height limitations upon building structures in the District of Columbia,7 9
enacting any measures affecting the Commission on Mental Health, 8° enacting any measure affecting the United States courts, the U.S. Attorney,
or the U.S. Marshal, 8 1 or, temporarily, amending any provision of certain
criminal laws.8 2 Similar limitations upon authority were expressly imposed upon actions affecting the National Zoological Park, the National
Guard of the District of Columbia, the Washington Aqueduct, and the
National Capital Planning Commission.83 Another restriction prohibits
the Council from removing the Hatch Act's84 application to the political
77. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(a)(4) (1981 & Supp. 1984) provides, inter alia, that the
Council will have no authority to "[e]nact any act, resolution, or rule with respect to any
provision in Title I1 (relating to organization and jurisdiction of the District of Columbia
courts)."
78. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(a)(5) (1981 & Supp. 1984) provides, inter alia, that the
Council will have no authority to "[i]mpose any tax on the whole or any portion of the
personal income, either directly or at the source thereof, of any individual not a resident of
the District (the terms 'individual' and 'resident' to be understood for the purposes of this
paragraph as they are defined in § 47-1801.4)."
79. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(a)(6) (1981 & Supp. 1984).
80. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(a)(7) (1981 & Supp. 1984).
81. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(a)(8) (1981 & Supp. 1984), provides, inter alia, that the
Council will have no authority to
[elnact any act or regulation relating to the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia or any other court of the United States in the District other
than the District courts, or relating to the duties or powers of the United States
Attorney or the United States Marshal for the District of Columbia.
82. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(a)(9) (1981 & Supp. 1984) provides, inter alia, that the
Council will have no authority to
[e]nact any act, resolution, or rule with respect to any provision of Title 23 (relating to criminal procedure), or with respect to any provision of any law codified in
Title 22 or 24 (relating to crimes and treatment of prisoners), or with respect to any
criminal offense pertaining to articles subject to regulation under Chapter 32 of
Title 22 during the 48 full calendar months immediately following the day on
which the members of the Council first elected pursuant to this Act take office.
83. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(b) (1981 & Supp. 1984) provides:
(b) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as vesting in the District government
any greater authority over the National Zoological Park, the National Guard of
the District of Columbia, the Washington Aqueduct, the National Capital PlanniAg Commission, or, except as otherwise specifically provided in this Act, over
any federal agency, than was vested in the Commissioner prior to January 2, 1975.
For illustrative examples of state constitutional provisions imposing limitations upon the
legislature, see COLO. CONST. art. V, § 25a; IDAHO CONST. art. 3, § 19; TENN. CONST. art. 2,
§§ 28, 31.
84. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-626.1 (1981 & Supp. 1984). The saga of Council attempts to
amend prospectively the Hatch Act restrictions in the Home Rule Act is an interesting story.
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activities of District employees. This limitation is a specific limitation
upon the express grant of general authority to develop the city's personnel
system. The Council is also circumscribed in its ability to fundamentally
restructure certain "independent agencies."" 5 Amendments to the statutes
establishing the District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics,86 the
Board of Education,8 7 the Public Service Commission,88 the Zoning Commission and Board of Zoning Adjustment,8 9 the National Capital Planning
Commission,9" and the Armory Board 9' are limited, but the Council may
In §§ 2501 to 2511 of the District of Columbia Government Comprehensive Merit Personnel
Act of 1978, supra note 62, at 95-102, the Council provided a "Little Hatch Act." This was
to become effective at the time that Congress removed the restrictions upon Council authority in D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-208(b) (1981 & Supp. 1984). See §§ 3202(h), 3205, 3602(f)3602(h) of the Merit Personnel Act. During congressional review of this measure, it was
determined that a veto of the entire personnel act might occur if the offensive provision was
not removed. Thus by emergency, and subsequently, permanent legislation, the current language of D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-626.1 (1981 & Supp. 1984) was adopted. District of Columbia
Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act Amendments of 1979, Aug. 1, 1979, D.C. Law 3-14, 25
D.C. Reg. 10,565. The application of subchapter 11I,
ch. 73, tit. 5, U.S.C. ("Hatch Act") to
District of Columbia employees has been sustained in French v. Devine, 547 F. Supp. 443
(D.D.C. 1982); Jordan v. Merit Systems Protection Board, C.A. No. 80-0465 (D.D.C. Jan. 6,
1981). Legislation is pending before the Congress to allow local initiatives in this area. H.R.
4235, 98th Cong., IstSess. (1982) (amending 5 U.S.C. § 7324(d)(4) (1982)).
85. See supra note 1, tit. IV, pt. F, amending and reenacting D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1303,
2-302, 5-412, 31-101, 43-401 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
86. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1303 (Supp. 1984). But see generally D.C. CODE ANN. §§ I1320, 1-1401 to 1-1473 (Supp. 1984).
87. D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-101 (1981 & Supp. 1984). The Council's relationship with
the elected Board of Education has varied. When political relationships have been good, the
two elected bodies have acted in harmony with one another. Early efforts of the elected
Council were designed to effect the employment contract of the superintendent. Generally,
however, the friction has been occasioned during the annual budget process, where the
Board of Education attempts to "end-run" the Mayor. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 31-103 to
31-104 (1981 & Supp. 1984). It is clear, though, that the Council may exercise its plenary
authority to amend any provision in the Education Code, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 31-101 to 31303 (1981 & Supp. 1984), and may enact general laws which have an incidental application
to the public school system. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-609.1 to 1-615.5 (1981), as amended
by D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-609.5 to 1-615.5 (Supp. 1984), linking the educational employees
into the city-wide merit personnel act. As an example of a general repealing bill to remove
archaic provisions in the Education Code, see University of the District of Columbia and
Board of Education Salary and Pay Schedules Adjustment Act of 1981, D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 31-1028, 31-1221, 31-1226 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
88. D.C. CODE ANN. § 43-401 (1981). See generally D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 43-407, 43-541

to 43-547 (1981 & Supp. 1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 43-405 (Supp 1984).
89. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-412, 5-424 (1981 & Supp. 1984). While direct action is not
possible indirect action is. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-901 to 5-907 (1981 & Supp.
1984); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1001 to 5-1015 (1981), as amended by D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 51001 to 5-1015 (Supp. 1984).
90. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2001 to 1-2011 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
91. D.C. CODE ANN, § 2-302 (1981 & Supp. 1984). See generally D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2325, 2-341 to 2-344 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
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enact laws which affect these agencies.
The Council's subject matter authority is also limited by the people of
the District of Columbia, through their use of the initiative and referendum powers. 92 In Convention Center Referendum Committee v. District of
Columbia Board of Electionsand Ethics,9 3 the Convention Center Referendum Committee sought to bar by initiative construction and operation of
the convention center. While the initiative power allows the electorate to
propose laws, this power is not without bounds. It is recognized that the
electorate's power to act by initiative is coextensive with the legislature's
power, and as such is limited to the proposal of legislative measures. Furthermore, the statutory authorization granting the electorate the right to
propose laws through the initiative process expressly excludes the right to
propose "laws appropriating funds." 94
The court held that the "appropriating funds" exception should not be
read as prohibiting wholly prospective fiscal matters and that initiatives
that (1) established substantive authorization for a new project, (2) repealed existing substantive authorization for a program (without rescinding its current funding), or (3) prohibited future budget requests were
within the realm of permissible initiative subject matter, and thus, not prohibited by the "laws appropriating funds" exception.9 5 The court held that
the restriction on the electorate's power of initiative serves only to prohibit
initiatives that would contravene existing budget request acts. It does not
prohibit or restrict the electorate's power of initiative in purely prospective
legislation of a fiscal nature.
There have been several other cases interpreting the subject matter limitations of the Home Rule Act. In Districtof Columbia v. Greater Washington CentralLabor Council,9 6 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
considered whether the Council could repeal a specific provision of the
federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act that provided coverage for private sector employees in the District of Columbia
92. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-281 to 1-295 (1981 & Supp. 1984), implemented by D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 1-1320 to 1-1325 (1981), as amended by D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1320 to 1-1325
(Supp. 1984).
93. 441 A.2d 889 (D.C. 1981) (en banc).
94. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-281(a) (1981 & Supp. 1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1320(k)(1)
(Supp. 1984).
95. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-281(a) (1981 & Supp. 1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1320(k)(l)
(Supp. 1984).
96. 442 A.2d l10, reh'g denied, 445 A.2d 960 (D.C. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261
(1983).
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under the federal system.97 The court held that the proscription on Council authority that prohibited the Council from amending or repealing acts
of Congress that affected a function of the United States9 8 only applied
when the Council attempted to amend an act of Congress of national application, rather than one that merely affected local District matters.9 9 The
court viewed the act of Congress extending the provisions of the federal
law to the District of Columbia °° as a totally separate local act within the
legislative authority of the Council.
In Labor Council the court also considered the restrictions upon the
Council that prohibited legislation on the local' 0 ' and federal 0 2 court systems. The court studied the enforcement of orders in the superior court as
an equitable matter, holding that such authority was already available in
the trial court.'0 3 In reviewing the appellate authority of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, the court again concluded that its authority
was carefully delineated in accordance with the District of Colulmbia Administrative Procedure Act."0 Thus, the Council was acting within its assigned authority.' 0 5 In studying any impact upon the federal court system,
the court of appeals concluded that the Council had legislated upon "a
'local matter' "106 by "merely repeal[ing] the congressional incorporation
of a national law into local statutes."' 0 7 While the local enactment was of
the type which Congress may well have intended the Council to consider,
the change in the workers' compensation system did affect functions of
officers of the United States.'
Only by reviewing this legislation from the
perspective of a local law can the obvious federal impact be justified as de
minimus and thus, not within the conduct proscribed by the Home Rule
Act.'0 9
97. D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-501 (1973) (current version at D.C.
(1981 & Supp. 1984)).
98. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(a)(3) (1981 & Supp. 1984).

CODE ANN.

§ 36-501

99. Labor Council, 442 A.2d at 116-17.

100. Id.at 117.
101. Id. at 115-18. See also supra note 76.
102. See supra note 81.
103. Labor Council, 442 A.2d at 117.
104. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1502 to 1-1510 (1981), as amended by D.C. CODE ANN. §§ I1502 to 1-1510 (Supp. 1984).
105. Labor Council, 442 A.2d at 118.
106. Id.
107. Id

108. Id.at 118-19.
109. Id at 119. The federal government exercised significant control over the manage-

ment of the workers' compensation system. See 33 U.S.C. § 939; see also Memorandum to
the Hon. Marion S. Barry, Jr., from Judith W. Rogers, Corporation Counsel (April 21,
1980).
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The Council's authority to legislate on the jurisdiction of the District of
Columbia courts was considered again in CapitolHill Restoration Society
v. Moore." ° In Moore two issues were presented: whether the court of
appeals could exercise direct review over an agency action that did not
involve a "contested case" under the District of Columbia Administrative
Procedure Act;"'. and, whether the Council could statutorily confer the
jurisdiction of the court." 2
The court held that because the Council and not the Congress had authorized the review of the agency decision, direct review was precluded. "3
At issue specifically in Moore was a provision within the Demolition Ordinance affecting historic landmarks that provided for appellate review of
the executive decision under the ordinance in the court of appeals.
The ordinance did not involve a "contested case" - as was conceded by
all parties-and thus the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure
Act review route was unavailable. Thus, the only authority for immediate
review by the court of appeals was within an organic act. This second
approach was attractive in that the court of appeals had earlier sustained
such a review when authorized by the Congress in matters affecting minimum wages." 4 The court of appeals concluded, however, that the Council
was without authority to exercise this previously-approved congressional
route because of the proscription in the Home Rule Act limiting the Council's authority to affect the courts' jurisdiction. 5 Nevertheless, the court
of appeals may still exercise appellate jurisdiction in these cases, as long as
the superior court has dealt with the agency decision in the first
16
instance.'
In District of Columbia v. Sullivan," 7 the court approved the Council's
enactment of the Traffic Adjudication Act of 1978." 8 This Act removed
certain traffic offenses from the realm of "criminal" offenses. As a result of
this legislation, traffic offenses that formerly were presented in the superior
court were handled administratively by the Bureau of Traffic Adjudica110. 410 A.2d 184 (D.C. 1979).
111. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1509 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
112. See restrictions imposed by D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(a)(4) (1981 & Supp. 1984).
But see French, Broadened Concepts ofStanding in the Local District ofColumbia Courts, 23

HOWARD L.J. 256 (1980) (an expansive analysis of this jurisdictional matter).
113. Moore, 410 A.2d at 187.
114. Id (citing Hotel Assoc. of Wash., D.C. v. Minimum Wage and Indust. Safety Bd.,
318 A.2d 294 (D.C. 1974) (en banc)).
115. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(a)(6) (1981 & Supp. 1984).
116. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-721 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
117. 436 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1981).
118. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 40-601 to 40-602 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
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tion." 9 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals concluded that the
Traffic Act neither changed the criminal jurisdiction of the superior court
nor affected the appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeals. The sole
change was that certain traffic violations that had previously constituted
criminal offenses were no longer categorized as criminal. 2 '
In addition, the Sullivan court considered the issue of whether adjudication under the Traffic Act resulted in a "contested case," which under
Moore is directly reviewable by the court of appeals. The court agreed
that such a proceeding was adjudicative and therefore consistent with the
definition of "contested case." Nevertheless, the court held that it was
within the Council's authority to create explicit or implicit exceptions to
this definition. 121
In contrast to the expansion of the Council's authority over the judiciary, the Council's authority to tax has been limited. In enacting section
605 of the Revenue Act of 1975,122 the Council found a basis to levy a tax
upon nonresident professionals who operated an unincorporated business
in the District. Under the plain meaning of the Home Rule Act proscription relating to the "imposit[ion of] any tax on . . . the personal income
. . . of any individual not a resident of the District," such a tax was
permitted. 123
In deciding a suit, however, to enjoin collection of the tax as beyond the
authority of the Council, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in
Bishop v. District of Columbia124 primarily relied on Congress' intent in
prohibiting a commuter tax. 1 25 In accord with congressional intent, the
court in Bishop held that the tax, imposed on nonresident unincorporated
professionals and personal service businesses, was an unauthorized extension of the Council's authority. Although the enactment of the tax carefully tracked the limit of the Council's authority, the characterization of
the tax as a franchise or gross receipts tax was inappropriate. The court
concluded that the will of Congress should control over a technical reading
of the statute. Accordingly, the tax upon unincorporated businesses was
119. Sullivan, 436 A.2d at 365-66.
120. Id.

121. Id.at 367.
122. D.C. Law 1-23, effective Oct. 21, 1975, [1975] D.C. Stat. 47.
123. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
124. 411 A.2d 997 (D.C. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980), on remand,
109 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 101 (D.C. Super. Ct., Dec. 3, 1980), noted Comment, Bishop v.
District of Columbia: Taxation of UnincorporatedProfessionals' Net Income Violates Home
Rule, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 1033 (1980).
125. Bishop, 411 A.2d at 998-99.
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invalidated.' 2 6
In McIntosh v. Washington,"2 7 the court again looked to congressional
intent to interpret a Home Rule Act provision. In McIntosh, the court
reviewed whether the Council's enactment of a criminal provision that
strengthened the District's gun control laws violated a Home Rule Act provision, which expressly denied the Council the authority to enact criminal
128
laws that already had been addressed in titles 22 and 23 of the Code.
The Council's authority to enact regulations strengthening gun control had
been upheld earlier in Maryland & Districtof Columbia Rfle & PistolAss'n
v. Washington129 and the Council relied upon its pre-Home Rule authority
30
to avoid the strictures of the Home Rule Act.'
The court examined the legislative history behind the alleged prohibition against enactment of legislation such as the Gun Control Regulation
and determined that Congress' intent was merely to place a time constraint
on the Council's activity in this area until the District's criminal code could
be evaluated and reviewed by the respective congressional committees.13
The history of local gun control legislation in the pre-Home Rule era was
traced. In earlier litigation the city council's gun control laws' 32 did not
conflict with provisions of the District's criminal code' 33 and federal gun
control laws. 134 The court determined that these local initiatives to
strengthen control of handguns did not interfere or conflict with Congress'
national gun laws 135 or the provisions of the District of Columbia Code
adopted by the Congress on the same subject. 136 Thus, the court held that
the Council's enactment to strengthen local gun control laws was within
the Council's delegated authority.
Although the Council's authority is expansive in most areas of legislation, the Council's authority is restricted by procedural limitations. The
specific procedural limitations on the Council include the appropriate use
of acts or resolutions to carry out public policies; 3 7 the requirement of
126. Id at 999.
127. 395 A.2d 744 (D.C. 1978).
128. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(a)(9) (1981 & Supp. 1984).
129. 442 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

130. D.C. CODE

ANN.

§ 1-321 (1981 & Supp. 1984).

131. McIntosh, 395 A.2d at 751; cf. Sullivan, 436 A.2d at 366.
132. McIntosh, 395 A.2d at 752 (citing D.C. Pol. Reg. Arts. 50-55).
133. Id. at 752-53.
134. Id at 753.
135. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928

(1982).
136. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3201 to 22-3217 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
137. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-229 (1981 & Supp. 1984). The use of resolutions by the Council has been a constant source of conflict between the executive and legislative branches of
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prior notice of intended actions and of publication and codification of
adopted measures; 38 the requirement of two readings in substantially the
same form for all permanent enactments; 39 and the proper use of emer40

gency acts. 1

The Council may adopt a temporary emergency act to respond to exigent circumstances.' 4 ' Two-thirds of the members of the Council determine that an emergency exists 142 by adopting a resolution declaring an
emergency. Thereafter, by simple majority vote, an act is adopted to respond to the emergency.' 4 3 Emergency acts are adopted after a single
45
reading.'" There is no congressional review of these enactments.
In a case involving the use of the Council's emergency powers, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in District of Columbia v. Washington
Home Ownership Council, Inc.,146 severely curtailed the Council's authority. In Home Ownership Council, a nonprofit corporation, engaged in the
government. See Memorandum to Judith W. Rogers, Special Assistant for Legislation, from
John R. Risher, Jr., Corporation Counsel, D.C. (Aug. 31, 1976); Memorandum to Chairman
Sterling Tucker from Edward B. Webb, Jr., General Counsel (Oct. 19, 1976) (assessing the
conflicting views).
A thoughtful analysis by McKay, Separationof Powers in the District of Columbia Under

Home Rule, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 515 (1978), exhaustively recounts the history of the relationship. Following the Chadha case, discussed infra text accompanying notes 154-217, a
consensus of opinion has emerged reflective that federal constitutional separation of powers
analysis has no direct analogy to the District's governmental system.
Illustrative examples authorizing the use of legislative vetoes, condemned in Chadha,include: D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-242(12), 1-612.1(g), 1-618.170) (1981 & Supp. 1984). Pending
congressional legislation is designed to allow the use of resolutions if authorized by an act of
the Council. H.R. 4071, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
138. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-227(c) (1981 & Supp. 1984).
139. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-229(a) (1981 & Supp. 1984).
140. See infra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
141. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-229(a) (1981 & Supp. 1984).
142. Id. In fact, the style of the District's current emergency power is a curious holdover
from the days of an administrative agency model of local government. D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 1-1506(c) (1981) provides for a 120 day period for emergency rules of District administrative agencies. Most state constitutions provide for emergency acts, but these are permanent
acts that become effective more quickly than regular enactments of the legislature.
143. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-227, notes § 412 (Supp. 1984). This method provides the interesting circumstance of allowing the constitutional-majority of the Council to determine
that an emergency circumstance is present warranting a particular solution. Once having
established an emergency, then the simple majority of the Council may craft a different
solution to the emergency circumstance than originally presented. An alternative model
better designed to link the declaration of the emergency with the statutory outcome would
be to adopt but one legislative document: the act with internal findings of an emergency, all
by a single two-thirds vote.
144. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-229(a) (1981 & Supp. 1984).
145. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(c)(1) (1981 & Supp. 1984).
146. 415 A.2d 1349 (D.C. 1980) (en banc).
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District's rental housing market, brought suit to enjoin a series of emergency acts of the Council that imposed a moratorium upon the conversion
of rental property to condominiums. The Council determined that the
scarcity and cost of rental housing mandated restrictions upon the conversion of rental units to condominiums or cooperatives that were beyond the
financial reach of most District residents. The finding of an emergency
was not disputed by the plaintiffs. 147 The court of appeals looked to "the
intent of Congress" 148 to determine the limits on the Council's exercise of
delegated authority. Rather than enacting permanent legislation subject to
congressional review, the Council had adopted a continuing series of identical emergency acts responsive to the same unchanging scarcity of rental
units. 149 The Council, by enacting these emergency measures, inappropriately avoided congressional review.' 5 ° Thus, the emergency measures
were defective.
Once the Council determines that an emergency does in fact exist, however, the courts give considerable deference to its determination. In American Federation of Government Employees v. Barry, the Council's authority
to enact emergency legislation regarding the merit personnel act was challenged. 1" The court balanced "deference to the legislative authority of the
Council, with [its] . . .own duty to oversee Council action which might
exceed congressionally delegated authority."' 52 The court held that once
the Council finds an emergency, the court need only check that the act was
facially valid and consistent
with the Council's legislative authority in con53
junction with Congress. 1
C. Summary and Conclusions-Congressionally-DelegatedAuthority
Litigation under the Home Rule Act has involved both the substantive
limitations upon the Council's authority and the Council's compliance
with the procedural requirements imposed by the Home Rule Act. In each
of the decisions studied, however, no consideration has been given to the
new constitutional relationship between the District of Columbia and the
Congress and President as a result of the seminal Chadha decision. Delegation of national authority to a local government under Home Rule is
assured, but the manner in which it is exercised must be examined.
147. Id.at 1353.

148. Id.at 1351.
149. Id.at 1353-54 & n.16.
150. Id.at 1357-58.
151.

459 A.2d 1045, 1050 (D.C. 1983).

152. Id.at 1050.
153. Id.at 1051.
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NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ERA--

RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONGRESS AND
THE EXECUTIVE

A.

The Case

In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, Jagdish Rai
Chadha, an alien who had been admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa, remained in the country after his visa expired. Upon
being ordered by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to show
cause why he should not be deported, Chadha applied for suspension of
the deportation. The immigration judge, acting pursuant to section
244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 15 4 which authorized the
Attorney General to suspend deportation once it is shown that the applicant meets certain requirements, ordered the suspension of Chadha's deportation and reported the suspension to Congress as required by section
244(c)(1) of the Immigration Act.' 5'
Subsequently, pursuant to section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration Act, the
House of Representatives adopted a simple resolution vetoing the suspension.' 56 The immigration judge then reopened deportation proceedings.
As a result, Chadha moved to terminate the proceedings on the ground
that the legislative veto provision exercised by the House of Representatives was unconstitutional. Both the immigration judge and the Board of
Immigration Appeals declined to rule on the constitutionality of the provision and ordered Chadha deported. Chadha then filed a petition for review of the order with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The
court held that the veto provision violated the separation of powers doctrine and ordered the Attorney General to cease deportation proceedings.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality
of permitting one House of Congress to invalidate a decision of an immigration judge, an employee of the Executive Branch acting under authority
delegated to the Attorney General. 5 7 The Supreme Court, in an opinion
authored by the Chief Justice and joined by six other Justices, studied the
specific provisions of the Constitution governing Congress' lawmaking
functions. The Court concluded that the "requirement that all legislation
be presented to the President before becoming law was uniformly accepted
by the Framers [at the Constitutional Convention]." Thus, because an or154. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1982) [hereinafter cited as the Act].
155. 8 U.S.C. 1254(c)(1) (1982).
156. H.R. Res. 926, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 40,800 (1975) (adopted pursu-

ant to 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982)).
157.

Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2769-70.
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'
der of the single House is "essentially legislative in purpose and effect," 158
the full range of constitutional procedural provisions is mandated.
To arrive at this conclusion, the Court first looked to the purposes underlying the presentment clause and the bicameralism requirement of article V According to the Court, the underlying purpose in providing the
President with the limited and qualified power to nullify proposed legislation was to protect against arbitrary action by Congress.' 6 ° Likewise, bicameralism requires that laws should not take effect unless and until they
have been fully and carefully considered. Under the Framers' view, therefore, the President's participation in the legislative process was to protect
people from improvident laws. The division of Congress into two bodies
also assured the result that legislative power would be exercised only after
full study and debate.' 6 '
The Court noted that the Constitution provided for a division of delegated powers of the government into three categories in order to assure
that each branch would confine itself to its responsibilities. Although the
Court determined that when a branch acts, it presumptively acts within its
assigned sphere, 162 it held that, because the action of the House of Representatives in exercising the legislative veto was a use of legislative power,
63
the procedural requirements of presentment and bicameralism applied.
The veto mechanism in section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration Act allowed

158. Id. There is no reason to quibble about the rationale of Chadha or its precise
breadth, because it is certain that the actions of the Council of the District of Columbia are
legislative in character, as that notion is used in Chadha. While great breadth has been
attributed to the opinion of the Supreme Court in Chadha, Karl Llewellyn cautions in his
book, The Bramble Bush, that a court may only decide the particular dispute before it under
a general rule applicable to a whole class of like disputes, and that anything written in the
Court's opinion, must be read with primary reference to the particular dispute. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 42, 54-55 (1973). Thus, the essential holding of Chadha would
run in this vein: When the Attorney General advises the Congress of an action he has taken
to suspend the deportation of a particular person who was found to be deportable following
an administrative hearing and a single house of Congress with little debate adopts a simple
resolution to reject the Attorney General's decision and reinstates the deportation order of
the individual, then such action by the House of Representatives is unconstitutional.
159. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2781.
160. Id.at 2782-83.
161. Id.at 2784.
162. Id.
163. To recognize an act of legislative power as such, the Court noted that one should
look to whether it contains matter that is properly to be regarded as legislative in its purpose
and effect. Indications of whether an action is legislative in its purpose and effect include:
(1) whether the act alters the legal status of persons outside the legislative branch; (2)
whether the character of the legislative action which the acton under consideration supplants
is legislative; and (3) whether the nature of the decision implemented by the action is legislative. 103 S. Ct. at 2784-88.
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one House of Congress to overturn a delegation of authority to the Attorney General without complying with the requirement of two House consideration and presentment to the President. The Court noted that
"Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is
legislatively altered or revoked" and that the decision "can be implemented only in accordance with the procedures set out in Article I." '164
The Court also held that the veto provision was severable from the remainder of section 244.165 Congressional amici argued that the subsection
providing the congressional veto was not severable from the remainder of
the section; therefore, all of section 244 had to fall and the Attorney General would have no authority to suspend the deportation of an individual
in the first place.' 6 6 The Court disagreed, stating that invalid portions of
the statute are severable "unless it is clear that legislature would not have
enacted those provisions which are [properly] within its power, independently of that [provision] which is not."' 67 Moreover, said the Court, a
presumption of severability arose because the Immigration Act contains a
severability clause and severability was supported by the Act's legislative
history. 16' The Court held that the tainted provision was severable and
169
unconstitutional, thus affirming the judgment of the court of appeals.
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment of the Court in a separate
opinion. The Justice would have resolved the Chadhacontroversy upon a
different separation of powers rationale by holding that Congress had improperly assumed a judicial function in effectively resolving Mr. Chadha's
specific legal rights and ordering him deported from the country. He
noted that the case fell squarely within the rule that "the doctrine [of separation of powers] may be violated when one branch assumes a function
that more properly is entrusted to another." 7 ' Further, the House
adopted a resolution specifically directed at a potentially small number of
persons without including any of the procedural safeguards the Framers
sought to provide when adjudicating individual rights. The Justice declined to reach the broader constitutional question of legislative vetoes by
resolution.
Justice White dissented in an extensive opinion outlining the practical
164. Id at 2788 (footnote omitted).
165. Id at 2788.

166. Id at 2774.
167. Id

168. Id.
169. Id at 2788.
170. Id.at 2790.
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effect of the majority's expansive holding."'7 The Justice traced the historical importance of legislative vetoes as a balance against accretion of excessive Executive Branch control over the affairs of the Nation. While the
frequent use of such provisions is a recent development, the Congress has
used legislative vetoes since its regulation of the Northwest and Mississippi
territories. The Justice assessed the ability of each actor mentioned in the
majority opinion-the President and the other House-to preserve and effectuate their constitutional authority in the face of single House action.
He concluded that each had the ability to protect itself against the unwarranted consolidation of power feared by the Framers. Thus, he concluded
that the legislative veto provisions of section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration
Act represent a permissible accommodation in the distribution of govern172
mental powers between the executive and legislative branches.
A fair reading of the majority opinion in Chadha compels the conclusion
that single House resolutions may not be used to exercise Congress' lawmaking authority. Further, the Congress may not authorize such a ruse to
revise on an ad hoc basis delegations of authority to the Executive Branch
contained in properly enacted laws. But the impact of such a holding is
dramatic, as Justice White noted in dissent:
Today the Court not only invalidates § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, but also sounds the death knell for
nearly 200 other statutory provisions in which Congress has reserved a "legislative veto." For this reason, the Court's decision
is of surpassing importance.
Today's decision strikes down in one fell swoop provisions in
more laws enacted by Congress than the Court has cumulatively
73
invalidated in its history.
The focus of legislative efforts in solving the constitutional and operational problems posed by Chadha has been in addressing the use of the
legislative veto process itself. How might Congress recapture, on an ad
hoc basis, the power that it generally delegates to others, be they the federal executive agencies, the President, or a subordinate legislature such as
the Council of the District of Columbia? Congress has two choices in curing these constitutional problems. First, the Congress may enact laws with
specific provisions that are not amenable to an improper interpretation by
the agencies implementing the act. Thus, from the perspective of the
171. Id. at 2792, 2796 (White, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 2795 & n.10 (White, J., dissenting).
173. Id at 2792, 2810 (White, J., dissenting).
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Framers, the political battle surrounding the enactment of legislation protects all segments of society from improvident or poorly drafted laws.
Alternatively, the Congress could enact laws which contain reporting
requirements or delayed effectiveness of agency rules or orders. This approach would allow the Congress to express its displeasure with a particular agency initiative by the enactment of a joint resolution or bill to limit
the agency's discretion. This method allows continued delegation of authority to executive agencies, but provides a proper process by which Congress may retain its ability to check unwarranted agency action. The joint
resolution or bill would be considered by both Houses and, if adopted,
presented to the President. Should the President veto the measure Congress would still have the constitutional authority to reconsider the matter.
This is the legislative reform route most favored by persons testifying
before congressional committees in the wake of the Chadha decision.' 74
174. In addition to the hearings before the House of Representatives Committee on
Rules, hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, legislative and executive summaries, and scholarly works may be reviewed. See generally The U.S. Sumpreme Court Decision Concerning the Legislative Veto: Hearingsbefore the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs,

98th Cong., 1st Sess. 116-29 (prepared statement of Eugene Grossman); id.at 159-226 (memorandum for the Attorney General, July 15, 1983); id. at 231-270 (Summary and Preliminary
Analysis of the Ramifications of INS v. Chadha, the Legislative Veto case, by Morton Rosenberg, Specialist in American Public Law, American Law Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress); id at 231-70; Breyer, The Legislative Veto After
Chadha, 72 GEO. L.J. 785 (1984); DeConcini, The Legislative Veto. A ConstitutionalAmendment, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 29 (1984); Hutchins, Legislative Vetoes and the Administrative
Process. A Constitutional and OperationalAnalysis, 15 TEX. TECH L. REV. 307 (1984);
Levitas & Brand, CongressionalReview of Executive andAgency Actions After Chadha: "The
Son of Legislative Veto Lives On" 72 GEO. L.J. 801 (1984); Lungren & Krotoski, The War
Powers Resolution after the Chadha Decision, 17 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 767 (1984); Smolla, Bring
Back the Legislative Veto. A Proposalfora ConstitutionalAmendment, 37 ARK. L. REV. 509
(1984); Spann, Spinning the Legislative Veto, 72 GEO. L.J. 813 (1984); Spann, Deconstructing
the Legislative Veto, 68 MINN. L. REV. 473 (1984); Strauss, Was There a Baby in the
Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J.
789; Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision A Law by Any Other Name?, 21 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 1 (1984); Comment, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha: The Death
Knellfor the Legislative Veto? 69 IowA L. REV. 497 (1984); Comment, A Legislative "House
of Cards" Tumbles, 8 NOVA L.J. 451 (1984); Comment, CongressionalControlof Presidential
War-Making Under the War PowersAct: The Status of a Legislative Veto After Chadha, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 1217 (1984); Comment, Immigration and NaturalizationService v. Chadha.
The Legislative Veto Declared Unconstitutional,86 W. VA. L. REV. 461 (1983-84); ConstitutionalLaw-The Demise of the Legislative Veto. The Strugglefor PoliticalAccountability, 17
CREIGHTON L. REv. 915 (1984); Casenote, Immigration and Naturalization v. Chadha The
Legislative Veto Vanishes, 17 J. MAR. L. REV. 523 (1984); Note, Severability of Legislative
Veto Provisions.-A Policy Analysis, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1182 (1984). These sources also pro-

vide commentary upon the severability and retroactivity topics considered below. Compare
General Assembly v. Byrne, 90 N.J. 376, 448 A.2d 438 (1982) with Enourato v. New Jersey
Auth., 90 N.J. 396, 448 A.2d 449 (1982) (two state supreme court decisions interpreting state
constitutional provisions similar to those confronted in Chadha).
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Left unresolved, however, is the other side of Chadh: that any amendment or repeal of an act of Congress must be accomplished with the same
formality as its original enactment. The Supreme Court's view of this issue is unequivocal:
Presentment to the President and the Presidential veto were
considered so imperative that the draftsmen took special pains to
assure that these requirements could not be circumvented.
We see therefore that the Framers were acutely conscious that
the bicameral requirement and the Presentment Clauses would
serve essential constitutional functions. The President's participation in the legislative process was to protect the Executive
Branch from Congress and to protect the whole people from improvident laws.
Amendment and repeal of statutes, no less than enactment,
must conform with Art. 1.
There is no provision allowing Congress to repeal or amend
laws by other than legislative means pursuant to Art. 1.175
It is clear that this dicta requires Congress to honor the constitutional
requirements of bicameralism and presentment in the amendment of laws
first enacted by the Congress. The process to ensure compliance with these
rules is simple: use joint resolutions or bills to enact, amend, or repeal the
public laws of the United States. Such a rule is consistent with the constitutional scheme for lawmaking.
B. Supreme Court Holdings After Chadha
Any limitation in a broad holding of Chadha was quickly dispelled in
two cases that followed Chadha. In Consumer Energy Council ofAmerica
v. FederalEnergy Regulatory Commission,176 consumer groups participating in an administrative proceeding before the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission challenged the exercise of a legislative veto retained by Congress in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978.17 The agency declined to
resolve the constitutional issue of whether the one House veto was effective
and revoked the congressionally-rejected rule. Under title II of the Natural Gas Act, the Commission was to implement an incremental pricing
175. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2782-85 & n.18.
176. 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1981), a'd sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v.
Consumers Energy Council of Am., 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
177. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3342 (1982) [hereinafter cited as the Natural Gas Act].
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program to shift part of the price increase resulting from deregulation of
78
natural gas to industrial users in order to protect individual consumers.
Phase II of the program required the Commission to issue a rule that
would be effective unless either House of Congress adopted a resolution
disapproving the rule.'
The House of Representatives exercised its veto
power to disapprove the rule. The court of appeals held that the veto provision contained in the Natural Gas Act was unconstitutional because it
prevented the President from exercising the veto power, that it contravened the bicameralism requirements of article I, and that it violated the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.' 8 ° The court then determined that, despite the fact that section 202 of the Natural Gas Act contained no severability clause, the veto provision contained in that section
was severable from the remainder of the section.' 8 ' The crucial question
was "whether Congress would have enacted other portions of the statute in
the absence of the invalidated provision." 8 2 Looking at the legislative history, the court determined that Congress would have enacted other portions of the statute and that the provision was not essential to the statutory
policy. Thus the provision was severable. The Supreme Court summarily
affirmed.
In Consumers Union of the United States v. Federal Trade Commission,"' the FTC announced a final rule covering representations of warranty coverage and disclosures of accurate information in connection with
the sale of used cars. The rule was submitted to each house pursuant to
184
section 21(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act,
which provided for submission of the rule and further provided that the
rule would become effective only if Congress failed to adopt a concurrent
resolution disapproving the rule. Congress adopted such a resolution and
a consumer organization sued, alleging that the veto provision was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, relying upon Consumer Energy, held in a
per curiam opinion that review by concurrent resolution is constitutionally
infirm because it violates principles of separation of powers between the
branches of government, does not follow article I procedures for lawmaking, and vitiates the delegation doctrine by allowing standardless exercise
178. Energy Council, 673 F.2d at 433.
179. 15 U.S.C. § 3342(c) (1982).
180. Energy Council, 673 F.2d at 448.

181.
182.
183.
Group
184.

Id. at 440-45.
Id at 442.
691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Process Gas Consumers
v. Consumers Energy Council of Am., 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
15 U.S.C. § 57a-1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as FTCIA].
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of congressional power.' 85 The Supreme Court again summarily affirmed.
Justice Powell did not participate in either decision and Justice Rehnquist would have set the cases for plenary consideration. Justice White
dissented. While emphasizing his principled disagreement with the majority in Chadha, Justice White noted the special nature of independent regulatory agencies that would support an outcome different than that for
persons within the Executive Branch under the control of the President as
in Chadha. He opined:
These regulations of [the Federal Trade Commission and the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission] have the force of law
without the President's concurrence; nor can he veto them if he
disagrees with the law that they make. . . . To invalidate the
[legislative veto] device, . . . merely guarantees that the independent agencies, once created, for all practical purposes are a
fourth branch of government not subject to the direct control of
either Congress or the executive branch.86 I cannot believe that the
Constitution commands such a result.'
The adoption of the challenged Senate concurrent resolution was voided
and the matter was remanded to the Federal Trade Commission without
specific consideration of the severability matter.
Chadha, Energy Council, and Consumers Union have dramatically adjusted the procedural aspects of lawmaking by Congress. By a wide margin the Supreme Court has determined that Congress, when exercising its
constitutional legislating function, must specifically comply with the terms
of the Constitution that demand consideration and adoption of bills or
joint resolutions by both Houses, followed by review of the President for
the exercise of his or her Constitutional role to veto or to approve acts of
Congress. The limited reach of Chadha was quickly expanded to include
activities of independent regulatory agencies over which the President exercises no day-to-day authority.
The challenged use of the simple resolution of one House in Chadha and
Energy Council as violative of both bicameralism and presentment requirements, was expanded to reach the use of concurrent resolutions in Consumer Union. The concurrent resolution satisfies the bicameralism
imperative, but leaves untouched the requirement of presentment to the
President.
The Supreme Court gives a strict construction to the constitution in matters of lawmaking process. Actions of the Congress to legislate must be
185. Consumers Union, 691 F.2d at 577-78.
186. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 3558 (White, J., dissenting).
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accomplished by joint resolution or bill. Similarly, when any laws of the
United States are amended or repealed, the Congress must honor the constitutional processes in achieving this objective. The authority to amend
acts of Congress may not be delegated to other departments or agencies of
government.
In all three cases the Court invalidated the challenged provision and
sanctioned the exercise of administrative authority without congressional
intervention. In Chadha and Energy Council the question of severability
was specifically addressed. In no case did the Supreme Court invalidate
the entire statutory scheme as a result of the legislative veto provision.
C. Federal Court Decisions on Severability After Chadha
Most post-Chadha decisions have held "legislative veto" provisions of
organic acts severable as long as the veto provision had not been used.' 87
In City of Alexandria v. United States,188 the city sought the difference between the price it paid for a parcel of surplus government real property
and a lesser price allegedly agreed upon under a prior contract of sale for
the same parcel. The government argued that because the congressional
review process, prescribed by the Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act, 189 had not been undertaken, consummation of a contract had
never been authorized. The city argued that the review procedure was unlawful under Chadha and that, therefore, the obstacle to contract formation had disappeared-because the Government Services Administration
had manifested its assent, there was a contract implied in fact. The court
held that under Chadha, it was unconstitutional for a committee of the
House of Representatives to intervene and arrest a negotiated sale of surplus property.' 90 The congressional action by the single Committee was
held to constitute lawmaking and was thus defective. This system, of
course, is more questionable on constitutional grounds than the systems of
legislative vetoes found defective in Chadha because a single committee
within one House could legislate for the Nation.
In EEOC v. City of Memphis,'9 ' the district court was presented with the

issue of whether the EEOC could lawfully enforce the provisions of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Enforcement authority had been
transferred from the Department of Labor to the EEOC by a presidentially-initiated reorganization plan. The authority for such a plan was con187.

See infra notes 188, 197, 208.

188. 3 C1. Ct. 667 (1983).
189. 40 U.S.C. § 484(e)(6) (1982).
190. 3 C1. Ct. at 678.
191. 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1089 (W.D. Tenn. 1983).
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tained in the Reorganization Act of 1977, which provides for congressional
disapproval of the proposed executive reorganization by a legislative
veto. 192 The proposed transfer was not rejected by the Congress and the
court determined the legislative veto provision severable. 193
In making its determination with respect to severability, the court reviewed the legislative history of the Department of Labor-EEOC transfer
and concluded that the Congress had ratified the transfer through explicit
reference in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and in the continued
funding of the EEOC enforcement activities under the antidiscrimination
act. Although validated in this circumstance, the principles of Chadha
would not permit the use of a single House resolution to affect the exercise
of the President's executive reorganization authority. Should Congress
wish to reject a proposed reorganization, a joint resolution or bill would
have to be employed.
The question of the validity of the transfer of enforcement functions
under the antidiscrimination act was again presented in Muller Optical
Company v. EEOC.'9 4 The court adopted the same analysis as the City of
Memphis court, relying upon the congressional failure to use the legislative
veto and Congress' subsequent ratification of the transferred authority.' 95
In EEOC v. Hernando Bank,'9 6 the EEOC brought suit against a bank
under the Equal Pay Act alleging that the bank had discriminated against
female employees on the basis of sex. The bank claimed that the EEOC
had no power to enforce the Equal Pay Act since the transfer of authority
from the Department of Labor to the EEOC had been effected under the
same reorganization plan challenged in City of Memphis and Muller Optical Company. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the
veto provision was severable. Because the reorganization plan conformed
to the substantive provisions of the Act and the veto had not been employed, the plan transferring enforcement authority was valid without the
veto provision. Thus, the EEOC was able to exercise its enforcement
authority. 9' 7
192.

5 U.S.C. §§ 901-912 (1982).

193. 33 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)

34,083, at 32,101-02 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 29, 1983).

194. 574 F. Supp. 946 (W.D. Tenn. 1983), a]J'd,53 U.S.L.W. 2123 (6th Cir. 1984). But
see EEOC v. CBS, Inc., - F.2d - (Docket No. 84-6063) (2d Cir. 1984) reaching a contrary

result.
195. Id. at 953-54.

196. 33 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,154, at 32,434 (5th Cir. Feb. 13, 1984).
197. Id at 32,437. The legislative veto provision is severable in that it was ratified by
Congress. See EEOC v. State of New York, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 379 (N.D.N.Y.
1984); EEOC v. Old Dominion Freight Lines, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 377
(M.D.N.C. 1984); EEOC v. Radio Montgomery, Inc., 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 378
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By contrast, in EEOC v. Allstate Insurance Company,'98 the court, relying on Chadha, ruled that the transfer of Equal Pay Act authority was
invalid due to the presence of the legislative veto provision in the reorganization act, despite the fact that neither House of Congress ever invoked the
veto provision. According to the court, any use of a legislative veto scheme
which has the effect of enacting laws without complying with the Constitutional prescription for legislation is unconstitutional. The court held,
therefore, that the Reorganization Act of 1977 and Reorganization Plan
No. 1 of 1978 were both unconstitutional and deprived the EEOC of its
authority to enforce the Equal Pay Act.
The Allstate Insurance court rejected the reasoning of the other courts
that upheld the transfer of enforcement authority to the EEOC. The court
held that the entire reorganization act was tainted by the inclusion of the
constitutionally-infirm legislative veto provision. In considering whether
the veto provision was severable, the court determined that "Congress intended the one-house veto provision to be an integral and indispensible
part of the entire [Reorganization] Act.' 99 Thus, the invalid provision
invalidated the entire Act and the purported transfer of enforcement
authority.
While the Supreme Court and the larger number of lower federal courts
following Chadha have severed the defective legislative veto provisions
and sustained the remainder of the acts, the split in judgments suggests
that the United States should seek clarification from the High Court as to
the appropriate method of implementing the principles of Chadha. One
n.3 (W.D. Va. 1984) (court's conclusion was "buttressed by the court's belief that the 1977
Act in no way altered or affected the substantive rights of the citizenry, which was not the
situation in Chadha. The Act and Plan simply transferred enforcement authority from one
part of the executive branch to another."); EEOC v. International Mill Serv., 34 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 392 (E.D. Pa. 1984); EEOC v. Jackson City, Miss., 33 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 963 (W.D. Miss. 1983); EEOC v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1837 (W.D. Tex. 1984) (court noted that Chadha was not controlling because the veto
was not exercised here, but still held that the provision was severable); EEOC v. Chudahy
Foods Co., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1836 (W.D. Wash. 1983). Additional pending
cases involving Chadha principles include: AFGE, AFL-CIO v. Reagan, Civ. No. 83-1914
(D.D.C. filed July 1, 1983); United States v. Exxon Corp., Civ. No. 78-1035 (D.D.C. -);
EEOC v. Merrill Lynch, No. 82-C-2922 (N.D. I11.
-); EEOC v. Dettering School District,
No. C-3-82-043 (S.D. Ohio -).
198. 570 F. Supp. 1224 (S.D. Miss. 1983), appealdismissed,52 U.S.L.W. 3889 (U.S. June
11,1984); see also EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1029 (D.N.J. 1982),
rev'don other grounds, 725 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1984) (where District Judge Bloch reached the
same result relying upon the Allstate decision). But see Exxon Corp. v. DOE, No. 5-103
(TECA, 1984) (holding legislative veto provision not retroactively defective or, in the alternative, if retroactive, then severable).
199. Allstate Insurance, 570 F. Supp. at 1232.
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district court, in its effort to make sense of the conflicting opinions and in
light of the absence of guidance from the Supreme Court, recommended
that the EEOC seek authorization from the Secretary of Labor to litigate
in his behalf under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act until the
effect of the Department of Labor-EEOC reorganization is definitely
resolved. 2°
D.

The Rules ConcerningRetroactive Application

Under a purist's view, a constitutional analysis of Chadha may be interpreted to hold all acts containing a legislative veto provision void ab initio.
This is unlikely, however, because such a result would create chaos. Leading Supreme Court decisions hold that future and prospective application
of major constitutional decisions is appropriate. On a case by case basis,
consideration is given to three factors:
(1) Whether the decision of the Supreme Court establishes a new principle of law or decides an issue of first impression whose resolution was not
clearly foreshadowed;
(2) Whether the prior history of the legal issue suggests that retroactive
application of a decision would retard the public policies served by the
new rule; and
(3) Whether a retroactive decision would impose a financial hardship or
an inequitable result. 2 ° '
In Buckley v. Valeo,2 °2 an action was initiated against the Federal Election Commission challenging the constitutionality of certain provisions of
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971203 and the provisions of Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.2' The statutes were attacked as a violation of first amendment speech and free association
provisions and fifth amendment equal protection. In addition, the plaintiffs contended that the method of appointment of the members of the
Commission under the FECA was unconstitutional as violative of the doctrine of the separation of powers under the Appointments Clause. 2 5 The
method of appointment of the members of the Commission provided that
200. EEOC v. Pan Am. World Airways, 33 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,106, at 32,193
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 1984).
201. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971).
202. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
203. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1982); 18 U.S.C. §§ 591-608, 610-617 (1982) (§ 591 repealed by
§ 201(a)(1), 93 Stat. 1367; §§ 608, 610-617 repealed by § 201(a), 90 Stat. 496) [hereinafter
cited as FECA].
204. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6096, 9001-9012, 9031-9042 (1982).
205. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2 requires that the President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, shall appoint all officers of the United States whose appointments are not otherwise
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the President appoint two of the six voting members. It also provided that
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House appoint the remaining four members. The Court held that the Commission
could not properly exercise its powers under the FECA, for the reason that
the appointment process was unconstitutional because the legislative
branch has no constitutional authority to appoint officers of the United
States.2 °6 Nevertheless, the Court accorded de facto validity to the Commission's past acts. The Court analogized this decision to its sustaining the
activities of legislators serving under an unconstitutional apportionment
plan.2" 7 Accordingly, the Court stayed its judgment for a period of thirty
days in order to give Congress an opportunity to take appropriate action,
allowing the Commission to function de facto in the interim under the
substantive provisions of the Act.
2" 8 plaintiffs,
In Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris,
in a class action,
challenged the constitutionality of Arizona's voluntary pension plan.
Under this plan, the state offered its employees the option of receiving
retirement benefits from one of several companies, all of which paid women lower monthly retirement benefits than men. A suit was brought
under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964209 alleging that the defendant had violated section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act by administering an
annuity plan that discriminated on the basis of sex.2" 0 The Supreme Court
agreed with the plaintiffs' contentions, 2 '' but held that retroactive relief
was not appropriate as the employer assumed that its pension plan was
lawful and that, more importantly, a retroactive remedy would have a dis2 2
ruptive impact on the operation of the employer's pension plan.
In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co.,213 a
debtor in a proceeding for reorganization filed suit in the bankruptcy court
seeking damages for breach of contract and warranty, misrepresentation,
coercion, and duress. The defendant sought dismissal of the suit on the
grounds that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 unconstitutionally conprovided for in the Constitution, unless Congress vests the appointments of such officers in
the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments.
206. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 143. The Court found that "most of the powers conferred by the Act. . . can be exercised only by 'Officers of the United States,' appointed in
conformity with Art. II, § 2, cl. 2 .... " Since the method of appointment of the members
of the FEC did not conform to the constitutional prescription, it was invalid. Id.
207. Id at 142.
208. 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983).
209. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
211. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3493.
212. Id. at 3509-10.
213. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
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ferred article III judicial power on judges who lack life tenure and protection against salary diminution. In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court
held that the grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts could not be sustained as an exercise of Congress' power to create adjuncts to article III
courts. The Court asserted that Congress did not have the power to create
adjuncts to adjudicate constitutional rights and state-created rights.2 14 The
Court, however, held that its judgment would have prospective effect only
and that its holding would be stayed for several months.21 5 Relying upon
Chevron Oil,216 Justice Brennan noted that retroactive application would
have vast and far-reaching effects because it would "visit injustice and
hardship upon those litigants who had relied upon the [Bankruptcy] Act's
vesting of jurisdiction in the bankruptcy courts. '"217
Prospective application of the Chadha decision fits well within the rationale of the Supreme Court in like circumstances. Significant constitutional adjudications that determine new principles of law and create
hardships and inequities through retroactive application are undesirable.
The pervasive effect of the legislative veto tool in acts of Congress cautions
against retroactive application: too many laws would be invalidated and
former judgments of the judiciary questioned. The new constitutional rule
of Chadha is a rule for the future.
III.

CHADHA AND THE UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

The preceeding discussion demonstrates that while the congressional
delegation of authority to the local District government has been broadly
interpreted under the Home Rule Act, no appellate case has decided
whether the legislative veto and concurrent resolution approval mechanism included in the Home Rule Act is constitutional. Nor has any court
held that the Council has the fundamental authority to rewrite the organic
acts of Congress without a specific role for the Congress and the President.
Thus, the following five provisions of the Home Rule Act are suspect.
One provision is defective because it provides no limitation upon the
Council's rewriting of acts of Congress, while the other four provisions fail
because of impermissible use of resolutions.
The general grant of lawmaking authority to the Council provides:
[The] legislative power of the [Council of the] District [of Co214. Id. at 80-87.

215. Id.at 88.
216. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
217.

Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 88.
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lumbia] shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation within
the District consistent with the Constitution of the United States
and the provisions of this [Home Rule] Act subject to all restrictions and limitations imposed upon the states by the 10th section
of the 1st article of the Constitution of the United States.21 8
This grant of authority runs afoul of Chadha's requirement that amendment or repeal of acts of the Congress must be accomplished in the same
fashion as their original enactment: consideration and adoption by both
Houses of Congress and Presentment and approval by the President.21 9
The process by which the Council and the voters of the District of Columbia may recommend to Congress amendments to title IV of the Home
Rule Act provides for the use of a concurrent resolution to effect the will of
Congress. The Act provides:
(b) An amendment to the charter [title IV of the Home Rule
Act] ratified by the registered qualified electors shall take effect
only if within 35 calendar days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays,
holidays, and days on which either House of Congress is not in
session) of the date such amendment was submitted to the Congress both Houses of Congress adopt a concurrent resolution, according to the
procedures specified in § 1-207, approving such
220
amendment.
A concurrent resolution to add new provisions to the Home Rule Act was
used to authorize the political tools of referendum, initiative, and recall in
the District of Columbia. 22' Thus, the act of Congress granting home rule
was amended by concurrent resolution without any role for the President.
This use of concurrent resolutions was specifically condemned by the
Supreme Court in Consumers Union.22 2
All permanent Council acts are submitted to the Congress following local approval for a period of congressional review. Two provisions of the
Home Rule Act affect their disposition by the Congress: one governs the
review of general laws, while one specifically governs review of matters
affecting the criminal substantive and procedural laws. These provisions
include:
Except [budget, emergency, and Charter Amendment] acts of
the Council . . . [and] as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, no. . . fCouncil/ act shall take effect until the end of the
218. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-204 (1981 & Supp. 1984).

219. See supra text accompanying notes 154-217.
220. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-205(a), (b) (1981 & Supp. 1984) (emphasis added).
221. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
222. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(c)(i), (2) (1981 & Supp. 1984). See supra notes 183-186
and accompanying text.
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30-day period . . . beginning on the day such act is transmitted
by the Chairman to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President of the Senate and then only !f during such 30dayperiod both Houses of Congress do not adopt a concurrent resolution disapproving such act.
In the case of any such act transmitted by the Chairman with
respect to any act codified in Title 22, 23, or 24 [of the District of
Columbia Code], such act shall take effect at the end of the 30day period. . . only if during such 30-dayperiod 1 House of Congress does not adopt a resolution disapproving such act.22 3
These two provisions are always used by Congress to review permanent
enactments of the Council. Occassional efforts have been undertaken to
reject Council measures, but only two such congressional initiatives resulted in the rejection of the Council act. One concurrent resolution of
disapproval rejected an effort by the Council to restrict the location of foreign chanceries.22 4 Ultimately, the Congress enacted comprehensive legislation to govern the location of diplomatic missions in the Capital.22 5 The
other congressional rejection was effected by simple resolution: reform of
the sexual assault law was rejected although the Council was clearly acting
within its assigned sphere of delegated authority. 226 These two rejections
are of the precise nature condemned by the Supreme Court in Chadha,
Consumers Energy Council ofAmerica, and Consumers Union.
Finally, the use of resolutions is authorized to control the operation of
the local police department by the President:
[W]henever the President of the United States determines that
special conditions of an emergency nature exist which require the
use of the Metropolitan Police force for Federal purposes, he may
direct the Mayor to provide him, and the Mayor shall provide,
such services of the Metropolitan Police force as the President
may deem necessary and appropriate.
[S]uch services made available. . . shall terminate upon the end
of such emergency, the expiration of a period of thirty days following the date on which such services are first made available,
or the adoption of a resolution by either the Senate or the House of
223. D.C.

CODE ANN.

§ 1-233(c)(1), (2) (1981 & Supp. 1984) (emphasis added).

224. S. Con. Res. 63 (Dec. 19, 1979); H.R. Con. Res. 228 (Dec. 20, 1979), reprinted in 27
D.C. Reg. 246 (1980).

225. D.C.

CODE ANN.

§§ 5-1201 to 5-1212 (Supp. 1984).

226. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-233(a)(9) (1981 & Supp. 1984). The time period restricting the Council's activity expired on Jan. 1, 1979.
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Representatives providing for such termination, whichever first
occurs.
Except to the extent provided

. .

. [elsewhere], no such services

shall extendfor any periodin excess of thirty days, unless the Senate and the House of Representatives approve a concurrent resolution authorizing such an extension.22 7
The provisions affecting the local District police allow the Congress to control authority delegated to the President and the Mayor of the District of
Columbia by resolution. When the Congress exercises its lawmaking authority, it may not do so in this manner.
A. Is the District of Columbia so Unique that the Congress May
Dispense with ConstitutionalProvisions When Exercising its
Authority?
Any argument that the principles of Chadha do not apply when Congress acts under its constitutional authority with respect to the District of
Columbia must be premised upon a special constitutional role the Congress exercises over the national seat of government. This special role, if
any, must be found in the constitutional provision affecting the District of
Columbia.22 8 This enumerated power merely provides that the Congress,
rather than Maryland or Virginia, exercises sovereignty over the District of
Columbia. The Supreme Court noted in District of Columbia v. John R.
Thompson Co., in commenting upon this congressional obligation to manage the affairs of the District that:
There is no reason why a state, if it so chooses, may not fashion
its basic law so as to grant home rule or self-government to its
municipal corporations.
[Tihere is no constitutional barrier to the delegation by Congress to the District of Columbia of full legislative authority, subject of course to constitutional limitations to which all lawmaking
is subservient .... 229
Under this power Congress may delegate its authority to local officials.
But the delegation of authority must comport with the constitutional limitations imposed by Chadha."3 ° The constitutional interpretation of bicameralism and presentment under Chadhamay be limited in applying only to
227.
228.
229.
230.

D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-102 (1981 & Supp. 1984) (emphasis added).
Thompson, 346 U.S. at 109-10.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 154-217.
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matters of national legislation, not to matters such as the District of Columbia. The superior court, in United States v. McIntosh2 3 ' and United
States v. Langley,2 32 adopted this narrow view. This view, used to preserve
several criminal convictions, 233 does a disservice to the national character
of the District of Columbia. In UnitedStates v. Cole,234 however, the superior court ruled "that the holding of Chadhaapplies in the present case. '"235
The court then concluded that the one-House congressional review mechanism affecting criminal enactments of the Council was unconstitutional.23 6
Thus, the purported congressional rejection of the District's sexual assault
reform law was ineffective. The court then considered whether the Congress would have granted local authority over criminal matters without the
safety valve of rejection. The court concluded that Congress intended the
entire criminal law amendatory authority only to be locally vested if an
opportunity of rejection existed. Thus, all Council authority to amend the
criminal laws was invalid as those provisions were inextricably intertwined
and had to be invalidated in one fell SWoop.2 37 The defendant had been
properly convicted under the preexisting criminal law and the motion to
arrest judgment was denied. Congress' plenary power over the District of
Columbia is equal to other specifically enumerated constitutional powers.23 8 The Supreme Court in Chadhaspecifically outlined the exceptions
to its holding, by turning to the Constitution to find those provisions allowing the Congress or the President to act outside of the bicameralism
and presentment requirements. 239 Creating an additional exception from
the constitutionally-compelled lawmaking procedures for the District of
231.

Daily Wash. L. Rep., April 20, 1984, at 789, col. I (D.C. Sup. Ct. Mar. 27, 1984).

232. Daily Wash. L. Rep., April 23, 1984, at 801, col. 3 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Mar. 30, 1984),
appealgranteden banc, No. 84-467, 84-564 (D.C. June 27, 1984).
233. In McIntosh and Langley, the defendants alleged that the congressional one-House
veto of an act of the Council amending the District's criminal code was invalid under
Chadha. Thus, the argument went, any indictment under the preexisting law was invalid in
that the amendatory law was in effect. While the author concludes that the purported rejection by Congress would be prospectively invalid, the author's fundamental premise is that
the Council was without constitutional authority to amend the act and thus the amendatory
act itself was defective. See infra note 237 and accompanying text; see also Wash. Post, Apr.
4, 1984, at CI, col. 2; Wash. Post, Mar. 29, 1984, at Al, col. I.
234. Daily Wash. L. Rep., June 6, 1984, at 1117, col. I (D.C. Sup. Ct. May 9, 1984),
appealgranteden bane, No. 84-703 (D.C. June 27, 1984). The analysis in this article has not
considered the serious constitutional problems of retroactive notice and ex post facto protection that arise in the criminal context. Under constitutional due process protections any

statutory infirmities must be resolved in favor of the criminal defendant.
235. Id.at 1121, col. 2.
236. Id at 1122, col. 1.
237. Id.at 1124, col. 1-2.

238. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
239. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2786.
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Columbia was not sanctioned by the Court. Thus, the exhaustive listing of
acts of Congress made suspect by the Chadha analysis properly includes
the Home Rule Act.24 °
While the Supreme Court has upheld delegated authority as it existed in
the early 1950's, it has not decided a case involving the Home Rule Act.2 4 1
In its most recent opinion addressing the governmental structure of the
District of Columbia, Palmore v. United States,24 2 the Court noted the District's special "state" court system and stated that "[the] Congress may also
exercise regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal government would have in legislating for state or local purposes .... 243 No
one would contend that the Congress might adopt a simple or concurrent
resolution to effect its "police and regulatory powers."
The decisions involving the Home Rule Act have all been decisions of
local courts. No appellate court decision upholds the procedural aspects of
the Home Rule Act that allow congressional rejection of Council acts by
resolution or the basic presentment clause problem of local lawmaking
without involvement by the President. 2 "
The ProceduralDefects- Change the Use of Simple and Concurrent
Resolutions
The procedural aspects of the Home Rule Act that permit congressional
"approval" or "disapproval" of Council-initiated legislation 245 may be resolved simply.
Despite the District of Columbia's corporation counsel's litigation posture in the Superior Court 246 and the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, 247 the Department of Justice, 24 8 and the House of
B.

240. Id at 2792 (White, J., dissenting).

241. Supreme Court review has been sought and denied in three instances: District of
Columbia v. Greater Wash. Central Labor Council, 442 A.2d 110 (D.C.), reh'g denied, 445
A.2d 960 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1261 (1983); Bishop v. District of Columbia, 411
A.2d 997 (D.C.) (en banc), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980); Hechinger v. Martin, 411 F.
Supp. 650 (D.D.C. 1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 1030 (1977).
242. 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
243. Id.at 397-98.
244. See infra notes 252-75 and accompanying text.
245. See Home Rule Act, supra notes 1, 6-8.
246. See Motion of the District of Columbia to Intervene, United States v. Cole, Crim.
No. F-5 111-82 (D.C. Super. Ct. decided May 9, 1984).
247. Dimond v. District of Columbia, No. 83-1938 (D.D.C. filed 1983). This civil action
is presently before the court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint or in the Alternative, for Summary
Judgment. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion of Defendants District of Columbia, Marion S. Barry, Jr., Margurite C. Stokes, John Touchstone, and
Maurice Turner to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint or in the Alternative for
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Representatives have endorsed curative amendments to the Home Rule
Act. 2 49 These amendments, if promptly adopted by the full Congress,
would provide a sound constitutional basis for the Congress to exercise its
retained authority over the District of Columbia.25 °
The amendments change the use of simple and concurrent resolutions in
the Home Rule Act to a joint resolution that requires action by both
Houses, satisfying the bicameralism clause, and consideration by the President, satisfying the presentment clause. The bill also provides a similar
curative amendment to the city's retirement law which may not be subject
to amendment by the Council.25 '
The curative bill also notes that "any. . .[law] which was passed by the
Council of the District of Columbia prior to the date of enactment of this
[amendatory] Act, .... [is] hereby deemed valid .. ,252
The ratification of actions of the Council in this fashion, although not
novel, is a prudent step to ensure that prior actions of the Council, taken in
good faith and in reliance upon authority presumed to exist, are not invalidated. Congress employed the same method when the Legislative Assembly was first temporarily, and then, permanently abolished. 253 This
measure will solve the legislative review-the congressional disapproval
scheme-problem highlighted by Chadha. Nevertheless, H.R. 3392 in its
present form solves only one-half of the Chadha problem.
The Committee on Government Operations favorably reported a comSummary Judgment at 57-76, Dimond v. District of Columbia, No. 83-1938 (D.D.C. filed
1983). The precise Presentment Clause problem has been presented to the District Court in
Dimond, at Second Amended Complaint 44.
248. See Response to Interrogatories [by the United States], United States v. Cole, Crim.
No. F-5111-82 (D.C. Sup. Ct. 1984).
249. H.R. 3932, A Bill To amend the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, and for other purposes, adopted by the House of Rep. on
Oct. 4, 1983. 129 CONG. REC. H 7903-07 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1983). H.R. REP. No. 393, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1983) states: "It is the considered opinion of the Committee in consultation with the District Government, that corrective legislation is the best way to excise the
District of Columbia Home Rule Act from the taint of Chadha." See Statements of the Hon.
Ronald V. Dellums, Stewart B. McKinney, and Marion S. Barry before the House Comm.
on Rules, Feb. 23, 1984.
250. See Home Rule Act, supra note 5 outlining Congress' retained authority over the
District.
251. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-746(a)(3) (198 1), as amendedby H.R. 3932, § 3, supra note 249.
See analysis of Bill 4-420, District of Columbia Retirement Reform Act Amendatory Act of
1982, which purported to amend some provisions beyond Council authority. Memorandum
to William R. Spaulding from Lawrence H. Mirel, General Counsel (December 8, 1982).
252. See Home Rule Act, supra note 211, at § I(i).
253. Act of June 20, 1874, ch. 337, § 10, 18 Stat. 116 (1874); Act of June 11,
1878, ch. 180,
§ 1, 20 Stat. 102 (1878).
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panion bill in the House 254 that has not yet been adopted by the Senate.
An eleventh-hour initiative by the Department of Justice sought to remove
criminal code amendments from the Council's general authority, thus jettisoning the bill's speedy enactment. 255
C. Amendment of Acts of Congress by Subordinate Legislative Bodies is
Unconstitutional
The District of Columbia and the present and former territories pose
unique problems under the principles of Chadha. These jurisdictions have
been given "congressional" authority to amend enactments of the Congress of local or territorial application. 25 6 This authority was conferred as
early as in the First Congress in the grant of authority to manage the
Northwest Territory.2 57 In the modern era, similar authorities have been
vested within the legislatures of Guam, 258 the Virgin Islands,2" 9 Puerto
Rico, 26 ° and the District of Columbia. 26 '
But the manner in which subordinate legislative bodies operate must be
carefully scrutinized. These bodies operate under authority delegated by
254. S. 1858, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
255. See Letter from Ass't Attorney General Robert A. McConnell to the Hon. William
V. Roth, Jr. 2-5 (Nov. 15, 1983). This saga of the interaction between the federal government and the District of Columbia is recounted in correspondence to the Hon. Ronald Reagan from the Hon. Marion S. Barry, Jr. (Nov. 15, 1983); see Wash. Post, Mar. 14, 1984, at
Al, col. 1; Wash. Post, Mar. 15, 1984, at Cl, col. 5; Wash. Post, Mar. 16, 1984, at C3, col. 1.
256. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; infra notes 257-62 and accompanying text.
257. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2800-01 n.18 (White, J., dissenting).
258. The local legislature of Guam is authorized to "modiqy] or repeal" acts of Congress. 48 U.S.C. § 1421(c) (1982). 48 U.S.C. § 1423(i) (1982) "reserves [to Congress] the
power and authority to annul the [laws]." The Guam Government Code does not contain
any provisions of law enacted by the Congress that solely affect Guam. These provisions are
within chapter 8A of title 48 of the United States Code. See generally Leibowitz, The App/icability ofFederalLaw to Guam, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 21-63 (1975); Soloman, The Guam Constitutional Convention of 1977, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 725-806 (1979).
259. The legislative authority of the Virgin Islands was found in 48 U.S.C. § 1574 (1982).
The Virgin Islands Code is enacted pursuant to the general grant of legislative authority.
While the authority of the local legislature is ambiguous with regard to amendment of acts
of Congress, see id. § 1574(c), it does not appear that this authority has been codified in the
Virgin Islands Code. An annual report of the laws enacted by the legislature shall be reported to the Congress. 48 U.S.C. § 1575(g) (1982).
260. The legislative authority vested in a local legislature in Puerto Rico was originally
codified in 48 U.S.C.A. §§ 811-845 (West 1952). By virtue of ratification of the constitution
of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico by the Congress on July 3, 1952, §§ 811-820, 822-844
previously cited were repealed (West Supp. 1983). See generally Leibowitz, The Commonwealth of PuertoRico: Trying to Gain Dignity andMaintain Culture, I I GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 211 (1981); Note, Puerto Rico,- Colony or Commonwealth, 6 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 115
(1973).
261. See supra note 2.
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the Congress. The enumerated constitutional power of Congress to manage the affairs of these jurisdictions is now suspect under Chadha.
Although specific language differs for each jurisdiction, each of these
delegated authorities allows the Congress to reject or annul an act of the
local legislature within some time period. For example, under Guam's
statutory authority, the Congress must annul an enactment of the Guam
Legislature within one year of its date of receipt by the Congress. In some
262
instances in the past, a role for the President has been provided.
Acts of the Council of the District of Columbia become effective at the
end of the 30-legislative day disapproval period unless rejected by the
Congress. These rejection provisions are, of course, constitutional. After
Chadha, however, such authority must be exercised by bill or joint resolution, rather than by any other previous mechanism.
The more fundamental problem is whether the congressionally delegated authority to rewrite or amend acts of Congress that affect the local
area-be it the District of Columbia or one of the territories-has become
defective under Chadha. The Council's rewriting of acts of Congress
causes a unique problem in the District of Columbia and the territories
that is not experienced by the federal administrative agencies. This is because the agencies and the President carry out congressional enactments by
issuing rules or regulations, not by rewriting the organic laws of Congress.
While it appears that the Council of the District of Columbia and the territorial legislations have authority concurrent with the Congress to rewrite
acts of Congress of limited application, the author has not been able to
verify any such exercise of authority by territorial bodies. 263 The Council
of the District of Columbia has exercised this authority on myriad occasions. Out of the 723 acts adopted by the Home Rule Council since its
inception, a significant number would seem to fall within the proscription
of the Chadha ruling.
Quite candidly, the full logic of Chadha would make the ability of the
Council to amend acts of the Congress suspect even from the legislative
side. Thompson and McIntosh at least present some constitutional dicta
262. Compare48 U.S.C.A. §§ 825-826, 1405o (West 1952) (repealed Supp. 1983), with 48
U.S.C.A. § 1423(i) (West 1952 & Supp. 1983) and D.C. CODE ANN. § I-147(c)(1) (Supp.
1978), § 1-227 (1981 & Supp. 1984).

263. Study of the organic acts of the Congress for the governance of Guam, the Virgin
Islands and Puerto Rico, and the respective local codes all reflect a similar conclusion: local

laws of the home legislature are codified in the local Code while the acts of the Congress
affecting the territory or commonwealth are codified separately in title 48 of the United
States Code. See generally Laughlin, The Application of the Constitutionin the United States
Territories- American Samoa, A Case Study, 2 U. HAWAII L. REV. 337-88 (1980); Leibowitz,
United States Federalism. The States and Territories,28 AM. U.L. REV. 449-82 (1979).
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that allow the Congress to delegate its authority to the District Council in
accordance with the congressional interest in removing itself as the "city
council" for the District of Columbia.2 64 But this would not surrender the
President's power.2 65 Never litigated before under the principles of
Chadha is the ability of Congress to allow a subordinate legislative body to
rewrite the public laws of the United States.26 6
Two other aspects of locally-exercised authority are suspect. The use of
the emergency powers authorized by the Home Rule Act has been considered to the extent that the court of appeals concluded that the Council
abuses its delegated authority when that thwarts effective congressional review.267 It is clear that the emergency acts of the Council should conceptually follow the same rules outlined in Chadha concerning permanent
acts: those which amend acts of Congress are defective. Similarly, while
the use of emergency acts has been sustained by the court of appeals under
both the Home Rule Act 268 and the predecessor reorganization plan, 269 the
Supreme Court has not credited the Council's use to be consistent with
Thompson,270 which requires congressional ability to reject actions of the
Council deemed unwise. At present, the emergency acts do not permit
such congressional action.
Under Chadha, the process by which the Congress authorized the two
264.

Thompson, 346 U.S. at 108-09; see also 395 A.2d at 753.

265. Cf Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2779 n.13 (President's approval of law does not immunize
it from constitutional attack).

266. See supra Part I(C). Nevertheless, it is important to note the several illustrative
enactments of the Council where the Council has the authority to act. The following enactments are valid because they do not amend Acts of Congress and create new law, or amend
previous enactments of the Council not amending Act of Congress, or amend regulations
adopted by the appointed city council: D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 40-1201 to 40-1208 (1981 &
Supp. 1984) (Child Restraint Act of 1982); D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1601 to 45-1642 (Supp.
1984) (amending D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-1601 to 45-1642 (1981) (Rental Housing Conversion and Sale Act of 1980 Amendment Act of 1982); Amendment to § 23 of Reg. 74-39, 21
D.C. Reg. 1285, 30 D.C. Reg. 55 (Vendors Regulation Amendment Act of 1982). The following enactments would be invalid if enacted in the future in that their amendatory and
repealing provisions may not be logically severed from the organic provisions: D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 7-411 to 7-472 (Supp. 1984) (Street and Alley Closing and Acquisition Procedures
Act of 1982) (Titles V and VII of this law amended myriad provisons of preexisting Acts of
Congress, including, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7-106, 7-201, 7-309 to 7-312, 7-319, 7-330, 161311 (1981). The following act may be sustained in that its repealing provision can be severed and the remaining provisions of the act may be given effect: D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 223112.1 to 22-3112.4 (Supp. 1984) (Anti-Intimidation and Defacing of Public or Private Property Criminal Penalty Act of 1982).
267. See supra notes 140-53 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 151-53.
269. Hobson v. District of Columbia, 304 A.2d 637 (D.C. 1973).
270. See supra note 241. But emergency rulemaking by an agency under 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(d) (1982) might provide a slender reed upon which to sustain the Council's actions.
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Amendments to the District Charter is invalid.27 ' While logic provides
that a general ratification of the Council's past action as de facto valid
should be presumed,27 2 the ongoing use of the initiative process causes
concern. If the process of congressional approval is now defective, actions
initiated after June 23, 1983, should not be permitted, until Congress affirmatively carries out the will of the people of the District of Columbia in
authorizing these tools of grass roots democracy. 273 Current actions of the
electorate under a now defective provision of the Home Rule Act cannot
be sustained. The invalid provision currently provides no authority to act.
It is interesting to note that the pre-Home Rule Council, acting under
the authority of Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1967, never purported to
amend acts of the Congress. Before acting, a specific grant of express authority from the reorganization plan was required as a prerequisite to action.2 74 Once a basis of authority was found, a local "regulation" could be
adopted. The fairest analogy to local self-government during this period
was that of a federal administrative agency for the District of Columbia.
Thus, under a harmonization of the Thompson and Chadha cases, the
adoption of regulations by the appointed city council presented no constitutional infirmity. Before Home Rule, Thompson would authorize no
more than that.
Assuming that this was the breadth of authority vested in the Council,
the House-adopted amendatory bill 275 would effectively cure any Chadha

problems. But far greater authority is vested in a locally elected government in the Nation's Capital and properly so.
Thus, the Council seems to exercise unfettered authority (subject, of
course, to ultimate congressional review and the Home Rule Act's internal
proscriptions) to amend acts of Congress affecting the District. Both the
congressional and Council statutory enactments are contained in the District of Columbia Code. Little mention is made of the local home rule in
the United States Code, and in this respect, the District of Columbia situation differs from that of the territorial legislatures outlined above.
D.

The Solution to the Problem

The House of Representatives has already provided for use of joint reso271. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-205(b) (1981 & Supp. 1984).
272. See infra notes 277-90 and accompanying text.
273. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-281 to 1-295 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
274. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1967, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. notes §§ 402(1)402(432), 406, at 1109, 1110-20 (1982).
275. See supra note 249. H.R. 3932 also includes a provision to correct deficiencies in the
District of Columbia Retirement Reform Act, § 3.
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lutions for all Congressional "approval" or "disapproval" action and has
affirmatively ratified the enactments of the Council of the District of Columbia since 1975.276 After Chadha, however, the District of Columbia
Council's authority under the Home Rule Act must be revised. The organic authority of the Council could be codified in the Public Laws of the
United States in much the same manner that it is for Guam and the other
territories.2 77 Congress may simply authorize the Council of the District to
adopt the District of Columbia Code, District of Columbia Statutes at
Large, and the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations as the Local
Public Laws of the District of Columbia. Assuming presidential approval,
subsequent action by the District of Columbia government would merely
amend local laws and not laws enacted by Congress. Thus, the President's
nonwaivable constitutional presentment authority would not be required.
Whatever limited reservations of authority Congress wished to maintain
may be codified in the original grant of authorized legislation, or achieved
by joint resolution.2 78 Specific repeals of acts of Congress affecting the
District of Columbia previously enacted by Congress may be included
within this measure because this would fall within the grant of Council
authority.279 Under this scheme, Congress would retain authority by dis276. Id. But cf.supra note 266 concerning special caveats. The most prudent course

would be to expressly disapprove the two vetoed acts of the Council and to ratify all initiatives properly adopted. See supra notes 271-73 and accompanying text.
277. In litigation interpreting the Organic Act of Guam, 48 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1424(b)
(1952), the federal district court considered that the Organic Act of Congress "serves as a
Constitution for Guam." Agana Bay Dev. Co. (Hong Kong) v. Supreme Court of Guam,
422 F. Supp. 593, 608 (D. Guam 1974), rev'don other grounds, 529 F.2d 952 (9th Cir. 1976).
Congress, of course, under the provisions of 48 U.S.C. § 1423(i) (1982) retains the authority
to amend or repeal an act of the Guam legislature in much the same fashion as under the
joint resolution legislative veto. Bordallo v. Comacho, 416 F. Supp. 83, 85 (D. Guam 1973),
afd,520 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1975).
278. An alternative approach, which was effectively used in the case of Puerto Rico,
would be to have the Congress enact the Constitution of the State of New Columbia as the
"constitution for the District of Columbia," coupling with that, joint resolution legislative
veto authority. This would not in any manner inhibit the development of full statehood for
the citizens of the District of Columbia. In fact, such an enactment might be enhanced. See
I D.C. CODE ANN. at 41-83 (1981 & Supp. 1984). But, for a dissenting view as to the utility
of this model, see Oulahan, The Proposed New Columbia Constitution.- Creating a "Manacled
State," 32 AM. U.L. REV. 635 (1983). Ideally, too, Congress would repeal its acts affecting
the District of Columbia ultimately to be enacted by the local government and placed in the
"Local Public Laws," as recommended in § 5 of the draft bill in the Appendix to solve the
Chadha problem.
279. An example of such an approach was used by the Council in its enactment of personnel legislation. Conflicting federal provisions were deemed superceded. D.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-633.2 (1981 & Supp. 1984). A number of Acts of Congress would require special
treatment because of mixed appropriations and statutory provisions in a single act. See
appropriations Act.
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approving specific actions of the Council or by amendment of the basic
grant of authority.28 °
E

Defective Provisions of the Home Rule Act are Severable

Drawing upon the principles of severability outlined above one must
consider how to treat constitutionally infirm provisions of the Home Rule
" ' The fairest
Act. 28
view of the Home Rule Act's congressional veto provisions is that they are not severable. The absence of a routine severability
clause and scattered remnants of legislative history suggest that the Senate
would not have agreed to enactment of the Home Rule Act without the
legislative veto provision. Although the weight of legislative history may
take the view that the Act is not severable, a careful review of the record
282
supports the conclusion that the will of the entire Congress is uncertain.
There is no legislative history concerning the role of the President in the
governance of the District of Columbia because the President enjoyed a
role in certain lawmaking,2 83 managed the police department in certain
285
instances, 284 and retained control of the fiscal affairs of the District.
Similarly, the legislative veto issue did not manifest itself as a significant
issue because of its frequent use in diverse laws enacted by the
Congress.2 86
Case law suggests that in most circumstances legislative veto clauses are
severable from legislative enactments. 287 Generally this has also been the
approach in cases following Chadha.28 8 For the reasons discussed below,
it is the appropriate course for the Home Rule Act.
Without a definite congressional intent to the contrary, a court faced
with a challenge to an enactment of.the Council under the Home Rule Act
should sever the invalid provisions, while retaining the general grant of
delegated legislative authority to the Council. At a minimum, therefore,
all actions of the Council where no veto was exercised would be sustained.
280. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-207 (1981 & Supp. 1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-233(c) (1981 &

Supp. 1984).
281.

See supra notes 218-27 and accompanying text.

282. For a recounting of the sketchy legislative history bearing upon the question of
congressional intention, see Committee on the District of Columbia, Home Rulefor the District of Columbia 1973-1974, Background and Legislative History of HR. 9056, HR. 9682,
and Related Bills, Serial No. S-4, Dec. 1974, at 3031 (Dec. 7, 1973 Conference Report); id. at

3050, 3052 (Dec. 12, 1973) (Congressional Record Remarks of Sen. Mathias).
283. See D.C. CODE ANN. § I-147(c)(1) (1973).
284. D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-102 (1981 & Supp. 1984).
285.
286.
287.
288.

See supra note 57.
See supra note 174.
See supra notes 188-217 and accompanying text.
Id
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Nevertheless, there are two circumstances in which the veto was used: the
rejection of the Council's chancery law and the local reform of the sexual
assault laws. In the instance of the chancery matter, the effect of the veto
was only of academic interest, in that the Congress subsequently adopted
comprehensive legislation occupying the entire subject matter field.289
The House's second veto was used to reject the Council's sexual assault
reform laws. This veto has been challenged in a number of suits where the
defendant was charged under the preexisting law and not the purportedly
amended law presumed valid because of the defective veto.290 One judge
of the superior court, finding Chadha applicable to the District of Columbia, has opined that all Council authority with respect to amendment of
the criminal laws is invalid. This decision, while narrow in its specific
terms, is amenable to an expansive construction which would invalidate all
enactments of the Council that have amended titles 22 and 23 of the District of Columbia Code. The continued enforcement of the criminal law
may be upheld by giving Chadha a prospective application,2 9 ' or by concluding that any amendment of the underlying criminal code was defective
in the first instance.
The more difficult question is whether actions of the Council since January 1, 1975, which have amended myriad Acts of Congress, may be sustained despite the exercise of questionable authority. In this instance, a
rule of severability will not be serviceable because it infers a limitation
upon the Council's authority to amend Acts of Congress not found in the
Home Rule Act grant of authority. Discerning the intent of Congress by
silence represents an unwarranted usurpation of legislative authority.
These acts of the Council, amending acts of Congress, should be given de
facto effect with a direction to the Congress to amend the Home Rule Act
as suggested in the appended draft bill.29 2 This time restraint is consistent
with decisions of the Supreme Court and the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals analyzed above involving new interpretations of constitutional
provisions (or of the Home Rule Act's emergency authority provisions),
where a retroactive application would cause considerable hardship.
F

DecisionsApplying Chadha to the Home Rule Act should be Given
ProspectiveApplication.

The analysis of principles concerning retroactivity 293 concludes that new
289. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1201 to 15-1212 (Supp. 1984).
290. See supra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
291. See text accompanying supra notes 201-17 and infra notes 293-94.
292. See infra part III G.

293. The true extent of a decision such as Allstate Insurancecan be shown by considering
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constitutional interpretations following Chadha should be prospectively
applied. Thus, whether by curative act of Congress or by judicial order,
the far-reaching and devasting effect of Chadha'sapplication to the Home
Rule Act may be avoided. Actions of the Council undertaken in good
faith and in reliance upon presumed constitutional authority should be
honored. Similarly, declarations of validity should be afforded to emergency acts of the Council not previously invalidated in judicial proceedings and to initiatives properly in effect.
Actions of the Council taken after the effect of Chadhaon June 23, 1983,
should also be afforded de facto validity. But as time passes, changes will
have to be undertaken in the manner of operation of the Council's legislating. Here the Council's own rule of severability should allow a court to
sustain an action of the Council which contains incidental amendments to
Acts of Congress. Minor technical amendments can be severed from an
otherwise valid action of the Council.
The process of initiative and referendum is more troublesome. The process by which the Congress authorized the use of such devices is invalid,
and thus continued resort to that defective authority must end. Thus, initiatives currently pending should be declared invalid pending congressional amendment of the Home Rule Act to authorize the use of the
initiative and referendum tool. In this amendatory bill, Congress might
ratify and exempt from certain procedural requirements pending
measures.

294

G. The Options Available to Congress
The entire analysis of this article has consistently endorsed delegated
authority to a local District of Columbia government. Minimal restrictions upon the exercise of such authority are both consistent with the spirit
of the Home Rule Act and the proper day-to-day management of the District of Columbia. Congressional adoption of a further series of amenda retroactive application to the invalidity of federal authority transferred by reorganization
plans. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. Since 1950 most redistributions of local
governmental powers in the District of Columbia have been effected by federal reorganization plans. See Reorganization Plan No. 5 of 1952, 17 Fed. Reg. 5849; Reorganization Plan
No. 4 of 1966, 31 Fed. Reg. 11,137; Reorganization Plan No. 5 of 1966, 31 Fed. Reg. 11,857;
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1967, 32 Fed. Reg. 11,669; Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1968,
33 Fed. Reg. 7747; Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1968, 33 Fed. Reg. 7749. Invalidation of
these plans would return the District of Columbia to its stage of government before many
independent boards and commissions were consolidated under the authority of the Board of
Commissioners.
294. Cf.D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1325 (1981 & Supp. 1984) (ratifying certain initiatives filed
before an implementing act was adopted by the Council).
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ments to the pending House bill would create the proper constitutional
framework for home rule in the District of Columbia and would comply
with the mandates of the principles of Chadha. Thus, joint resolutions or
bills are required for all lawmaking and the Council is prohibited from
amending Acts of Congress.
Enactment of less than that proposed in the draft bill reprinted in the
Appendix would result in continued litigation concerning the status of the
District of Columbia. Ultimately such litigation would require resolution
by the Supreme Court. The early action by Congress is both desirable to
obviate the need for continued litigation, but preferred as a matter of legislative supremacy in setting forth the proper dimensions of home rule in the
national capital. Authorization to adopt the Local Public Laws of the District of Columbia, coupled with a delayed repeal of Acts of Congress affecting the District of Columbia placed within the jurisdiction of the
Council, would complete the necessary revisions to the Home Rule Act.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Serious consideration must be given promptly to amendment of the
Home Rule Act to avoid a constitutional crisis in the District of Columbia.
This Article has explored the range of problems that emerged with the
mechanisms of Home Rule following the Chadha decision. The solution
posed in this Article will correct the constitutional infirmities in the Home
Rule Act and provide a basis for the continuing development of self-government in the national capital.
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POSTSCRIPT

During the printing of this Article, the Congress enacted H.J. Res. 648.
Section 131 of this appropriations measure adopted a number of amendments to the Home Rule Act in an effort to cure the defects noted herein.
Subsection (a) effected an amendment to section 466(b) of the Home
Rule Act with regard to the issuance of District of Columbia government
bonds. Subsection (b) effected the amendment proposed in section 2(a) of
the preceding draft bill. Subsection (c) amended section 412 of the Home
Rule Act to authorize the use of legislative vetoes by the Council. Subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g) effectively accomplished proposed amendments in
sections 2(c), (d), and (e), with slightly differing time provisions insofar as
criminal code amendments are concerned. Subsection (h), (i), and (j) are
the same as sections 2(g), (h), and (i) of the preceding draft bill. Subsection (k) attempts to achieve the same adjustment as section 2(j) of the preceding draft bill, but without the clarity surrounding measures over which
Congress exercised its legislative veto. Subsection (/) provides a severability clause to the Home Rule Act, while subsection (m) amends the Retirement Reform Act. Subsection (n) provides that these amendments to the
Home Rule Act will continue in force despite the adoption of permanent
appropriations.
The Congress did not adopt the fundamental amendments recommended by sections 2(b), 3 and 4 of the preceding draft bill. Thus, the
premise of this Article requires continued legislative correction or judicial
intervention. Recommended amendments affecting initiatives, see section
2(k) and (/) of the preceding amendatory bill, should also be enacted.
This measure was presented to the President who approved it on October 12, 1984.
APPENDIX
The following proposed draft bill implements the author's proposals to
provide a constitutional framework of government in the District of
Columbia.
98th Congress
2nd Session
H.R.

__

To amend the District of Columbia Self-Government and
Governmental Reorganization Act; to authorize the Council of
the District of Columbia to adopt the Local Public Laws of the
District of Columbia; to repeal inconsistent acts; and for other
purposes.
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IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
introduced the following bill; which was reMr.
ferred to the Committee on the District of Columbia
A BILL
To amend the District of Columbia Self-Government and
Governmental Reorganization Act; to authorize the Council of
the District of Columbia to adopt the Local Public Laws of the
District of Columbia; to repeal inconsistent acts; and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, that this Act may be cited as the
"District of Columbia Self-Government Reform Act of 1984."
Section 2. The District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act is amended as follows:
(a) Section 303(b) of such Act is amended to read as follows:
(b) An amendment to the charter ratified by the registered qualified electors shall take effect upon the expiration of the thirtyfive-calendar-day period (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, holidays, and days on which either House of Congress is not in session) following the date such amendment was submitted to the
Congress, or upon the date prescribed by such amendment,
whichever is later, unless, during such thirty-five-day period,
there has been enacted into law a joint resolution, in accordance
with the procedures specified in section 604 of this Act, disapproving such amendment. In any case in which any such joint
resolution disapproving such an amendment has, within such
thirty-five-day period, passed both Houses of Congress and has
been transmitted to the President, such resolution, upon becoming law subsequent to the expiration of such thirty-five-day period, shall be deemed to have repealed such amendment, as of
the date such resolution becomes law.
(b) Section 401(a) of such Act is amended by adding a sentence at the
end thereof to read as follows:
In the exercise of its legislative authority under this Act, the
Council may not amend any Act of the Congress.
(c) The second sentence of section 602(c)(1) of such act is amended to
read as follows:
Except as provided in paragraph (2), such act shall take effect
upon the expiration of the 30-calendar-day period (excluding
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, and any day on which neither
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House is in session because of an adjournment sine die, a recess
of more than 3 days, or an adjournment of more than 3 days)
beginning on the day such act is transmitted by the Chairman to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of
the Senate, or upon the date prescribed by such act, whichever is
later, unless, during such 30-day period, there has been enacted
into law a joint resolution disapproving such act. In any case in
which any such joint resolution disapproving such an act has,
within such 30-day period, passed both Houses of Congress and
has been transmitted to the President, such resolution, upon becoming law subsequent to the expiration of such 30-day period,
shall be deemed to have repealed such act, as of the date such
resolution becomes law.
(d) The third sentence of section 602(c)(1) of such Act is amended by
deleting "concurrent" and inserting in lieu thereof "joint".
(e) The first sentence of section 602(c)(2) of such Act is amended by
deleting "only if during such 30-day period one House of Congress does
not adopt a resolution disapproving such act" and inserting in lieu thereof
"unless, during such 30-day period, there has been enacted into law a joint
resolution disapproving such act. In any case in which any such joint resolution disapproving such an act has, within such 30-day period, passed
both Houses of Congress and has been transmitted to the President, such
resolution, upon becoming law subsequent to the expiration of such 30-day
period, shall be deemed to have repealed such act, as of the date such
resolution becomes law."
(f) The second sentence of section 602(c)(2) of such Act is amended to
read as follows:
The provisions of section 604, relating to an expedited procedure for consideration of joint resolutions, shall apply to a joint
resolution disapproving such act as specified in this paragraph.
(g) Section 604(b) of such Act is amended by deleting "concurrent" and
inserting in lieu thereof "joint".
(h) Subsections (b) and (c) of section 740 of such Act are amended by
deleting in each subsection the words "resolution by either the Senate or
the House of Representatives" and inserting in lieu thereof "joint resolution by the Congress".
(i) Section 740(d) of such Act is amended by deleting "concurrent" and
inserting in lieu thereof "joint".
(j) The amendments made by this section shall not be applicable with
respect to any law, which was passed by the Council of the District of
Columbia (including initiatives adopted pursuant to law, but not including
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acts of the Council of the District of Columbia specifically rejected by the
Congress), emergency acts of the Council of the District of Columbia not
judicially invalidated, prior to the date of the enactment of this Act, and
such laws are deemed valid, in accordance with the provisions thereof,
notwithstanding such amendments.
(k) The amendments to title IV concerning initiatives, referendum, and
recall are specifically approved by the Congress.
(1) To the extent that any initiatives are pending on the date that this
amendment becomes effective they shall be deemed to have been properly
filed in accordance with law.
Section 3(a). Except as provided in subsection (b), within one year of
the effective date of this Act, the Council of the District of Columbia may
adopt the Local Public Laws of the District of Columbia which shall include all laws of general and permanent application to the District of Columbia within the authority of the Council of the District of Columbia
presently codified in the District of Columbia Code or the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations.
(b) The Council of the District of Columbia shall have no authority to
enact laws presently codified as title 11 of the District of Columbia Code
nor any matter beyond the competence of the Council of the District of
Columbia under the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act.
Section 4. Upon the adoption of the Local Public Laws of the District of
Columbia authorized by section 4 of this Act, the following Acts are
repealed:
[The drafter should include here a listing of all Acts of Congress
which will now come under the authority of the Council of the
District of Columbia]

